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Abstract: When at the height of the ‘Arab Spring’ Egyptians from all walks of life took to 
the  streets  to  oust  one  of  the  Arab  world’s  most  long-standing  dictators,  it  took  both 
Egyptians  and outside  observers  by surprise.  This  report  explores  the events  commonly 
described as  the  January 25  Revolution  in  Egypt,  as  well  as  the  immediate  transitional 
period that followed the ousting of President Hosni Mubarak, marked by recurrent unrest 
and mobilization. Starting from a detailed empirical description of the events themselves, it 
will illustrate the conditions that led to the uprising by embedding them in a more structural 
analysis  covering  the  regime’s  origins  and historical  trajectories  as  well  as  more  recent 
developments in the last ten years. Together these circumstances created a set of political 
opportunities that inventive actors seized upon to set in motion a process that in the course 
of  only  a  few  weeks  mobilized  a  cross-class  coalition  to  bring  about  the  seemingly 
impossible.  However,  in elucidating the transitional phase and the struggles it  entails  in 
more detail, the report also shows how the opportunities and processes conducive to the 
breakdown of Egypt’s authoritarian regime are not necessarily those most conducive to the 
establishment of a new, democratic one.
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This report deals with the momentous change witnessed in Egypt over the last 
year, when the seemingly impossible happened. In the aftermath of what would 
come to be dubbed the Sidi Bouzid Revolution1 in Tunisia, Egyptians managed 
to overthrow one of the Arab world’s longest standing dictators in their own 25 
January  Revolution.  We  refer  to  the  events  as  a  revolution  throughout  this 
report,  because  this  is  how the  actors  themselves  describe  their  nature,  and 
because  it  is  the  terminology  employed  by  many  newspaper  commentators, 
observers,  and  academics.  However,  a  word  of  caution  is  in  order:  the 
transitional process has so far shown very little prospect of turning into a full 
blown social revolution, in that there has been very little economic and social 
change, and in fact it may even be argued that the nature of the political process 
1In Western media, this revolution has often been called the Jasmine Revolution after the example of the color 
and flower revolutions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. However, Tunisians themselves prefer the name Sidi 
Bouzid Revolution after the city of its origin, Sidi Bouzid, where a street vendor named Mohammed Bouazizi 
self-immolated in protest against undignified living conditions.
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so  far  has  turned  out  to  be  rather  conservative  in  its  effects  on  social  and 
economic conditions, especially for the long (and still) politically marginalized 
masses. What is more, even though nobody can deny the momentousness of the 
achievement of bringing down Husni Mubarak, with part of the elite that served 
as one of the pillars of the previous regime – the army – in power, and amidst an 
increasing crackdown on protesters and civil society, the application of even the 
narrowest concept of political revolution is at the very least questionable. 
Periodization
When  defining  a  periodization  of  Egypt’s  transition  from  authoritarianism 
several caveats are in order. These caveats relate to the question of when exactly 
the transition started, as well as the question of its end point.  Regarding the 
former, there are several possible starting points, the most obvious being the 
beginning of the so called ‘January 25 revolution’ on 25 January 2011, in the 
course of which long term ruler President Husni Mubarak was toppled. The 
other, less obvious one would situate the 2011 revolution as the peak point of a 
broader cycle of contention starting with the ‘resuscitation of civil society’ that 
began in the early 2000s with campaigns in support of the Palestinians, moving 
on to contentious movements devoted to domestic issues in 2004/5. While this 
is certainly no less legitimate a categorization than the previous one, it poses 
some  problems  regarding  the  identification  of  medium to  short  term causal 
factors that affected the structure of political opportunity faced by the youth 
groups  that  organized  the  events  that  led  to  the  January  25  Revolution. 
Furthermore, while the dating of events always implies a cut-off point that takes 
one actor’s position into account more fully than another’s, locating the start of 
the transition period at the beginning of the 2000s would unduly privilege the 
perspective of the activist groups to the detriment of the general populace, as 
well as most elite actors not part of the opposition landscape. Thus, for these 
reasons, the beginning of the transition period is temporally located at the start 
of the revolution in 2011. 
As regards its end point, the first and foremost of the aforementioned caveats is 
that as of yet there is no clear end point to the transition process. While it is true 
that Egypt is witnessing its first mostly free and fair parliamentary elections, 
this  process  is  at  the  same  time  accompanied  by  other,  more  worrying 
developments which suggest that it is as yet too early to speak of a transition to 
democracy. Instead, this report will  divide Egypt’s transition period into two 
phases, the first will deal with the process of regime breakdown, and thus the 
downfall of Egypt’s long-term dictator President Husni Mubarak. The second 
will  deal  with  Egypt’s  uneasy  transition  under  the  nominally  temporary 
guidance of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Inherent in the 
very nature of these most recent processes is the fact that they have yet to be 
concluded.  Thus  the  end  of  the  second  phase  will  be  somewhat  arbitrarily 
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placed at the time of writing of this report in January 2012. Instead of speaking 
of a transition to democracy, I will follow Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe 
Schmitter and speak instead of a transition from authoritarian rule, which leaves 
the  possibility  of  a  reestablishment  of  authoritarianism as  old  wine  in  new 
bottles open (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).  
In order to better embed the protest events, the following paragraph will 
be devoted to a quick summary of the formal steps of the transition process 
initiated by the SCAF after Husni Mubarak stepped down on February 11 2011. 
The following sections then move on to discuss the protest events and actors 
proper. The post-revolution transition process started with the SCAF fulfilling 
one of the central demands of the revolution by suspending the parliament – the 
latter having been constituted following rigged elections in 2010 that had for 
many Egyptians signified the death of their hopes for peaceful change – and the 
constitution  on 13 February,  two days  after  Mubarak resigned.  After  Assam 
Sharaf  took  office  as  prime  minister  on  March  3  2011  following  bouts  of 
protests,  the next  step on the timeline of  Egypt’s  ‘formal’ transition process 
came with a constitutional referendum, held on March 19, passed with a strong 
majority of 77% that at the time many observers interpreted as much a vote on 
the military’s performance/popularity as on the details of the proposed changes 
themselves.  These formal steps often followed a distinct trajectory whereby 
“the SCAF deliberated these crucial legal and institutional issues behind closed 
doors, subsequently leaked details about the content of the deliberations, gauged 
the reactions of political  players,  and then adapted the rules  – again behind 
closed doors. In addition, the SCAF attempted to generate some form of popular 
legitimacy for itself by holding a constitutional referendum on 19 March 2011 
in  which  Egyptians  were  called  upon  to  vote  on  11  changes  to  the  1977 
constitution. In a move typical for the high-handed approach of Egypt’s current 
military rulers, the SCAF subsequently issued a constitutional declaration which 
it presented as the result of the referendum, but which included 63 constitutional 
changes  instead  of  the 11 that  had been voted  upon in the  referendum (see 
Albrecht & Bishara 2011; Koehler 2012a). Among those, article 56 is especially 
problematic  since  it  invests  the  SCAF  with  wide  ranging  executive  and 
legislative powers and thus gives the current situation of military rule a quasi-
constitutional façade.” (Koehler 2012a, 16)
As a next step in preparing the upcoming parliamentary elections, held in three 
stages between 28 November 2011 and 10 January 20122, a first version of a 
much disputed electoral law was issued by decree in much the same fashion as 
on July 20 2011, only to be substantially revised in the months following its 
publication.3 After a period of sustained insecurity, parliamentary elections were 
2Al Jazeera: Egypt sets parliamentary poll dates, 27.09.2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/09/2011927141328264948.html
3http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/04/parliamentary-elections-law
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finally  set  to  take  place  in  a  three  stage  process  on  November  28  2011, 
December 14 2011 and January 3 2012. This parliament, currently dominated 
by  Islamist  forces  after  their  overwhelming  electoral  victory,  will  then help 
choose  a  100  person  strong  constituent  assembly  in  the  future,  tasked  with 
drafting a new constitution. After intense political debate, presidential elections 
are now set to take place at the end of May 2012.4 Until then, however, the 
power of the new parliament remains severely curtailed: 
“[M]ilitary rule casts a shadow over its future responsibilities: The constitution 
gives the People’s Assembly the power to legislate and “oversee the work of the 
executive  branch,”  but  the  SCAF  holds  overlapping  authority  to  make  and 
object to legislation, issue public policy, convene and adjourn parliament, and 
appoint and dismiss the prime minister and cabinet.”5
Protest
This part will chronicle the main protest events and developments in Egypt’s 
transition  from  authoritarian  rule,  covering  approximately  one  year  from 
January 2011 to January 2012. This period will be subdivided into two parts as 
described above, a period of authoritarian breakdown and a transition period 
with an open end. Even though the former is much shorter in terms of the time it 
covers, spanning from just 25 January to 11 February, it will be given equal 
space due to the dramatic nature of the events that unfolded during the struggle 
to end Husni Mubarak’s 29 years of rule. 
The January 25 Revolution (January 25 2011 – February 11 2011)
In the conventional story, the events that later turned into a revolution started 
when the popular Facebook group ‘We are all Khaled Said’ used its platform to 
call for a demonstration against torture and police brutality on January 25, the 
‘National Police Day’ in Egypt. The call, which went out on about 8 January, 
and was also publicized by TV channels such as Al Jazeera, quickly attracted 
the (virtual) support of hundreds of thousands of Facebook members.6 Behind 
this call  was a conglomerate of members of different  youth groups that  had 
formed in the last couple of years, among them the 6 April movement (named 
after  a  general  strike in April  2008),  the Coalition to Support  El-Baradei  (a 
group  in  support  of  Mohamed  El-Baradei  and  his  potential  bid  for  the 
presidency of Egypt),  the youth wing of the Democratic Front party and the 
Justice and Freedom movement.7 On the day itself, what was expected to be a 
4Al Jazeera: Egypt to hold presidential poll in May, 
15.02.2011http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/02/201221510046239254.html
5Al Jazeera: Explainer: The role of the Peoples’ Assembly, 
17.11.2011http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/egypt/2011/11/2011111710295238413.html
6Interview with activist, Cairo, 09.05.2011
7The account of the lead up to these fateful demonstrations reads almost like a spy novel, with secret daily 
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larger than usual demonstration, but nonetheless a singular event, for the first 
time managed to gather huge numbers of people, often spontaneously from the 
neighborhoods passed through. Protests erupted in a number of Egyptian cities 
between  25 and 26 January,  becoming  fiercely  violent  in  the  case  of  Suez, 
where  battles  with  the  police  continued  for  days  to  avenge  the  death  of 
protesters.8 The regime, taken by surprise by the sheer number of protesters that 
had  turned  out  on  the  25th,  made  a  largely  ineffective  move  to  contain  the 
protests anticipated for the 28th, and attempted to block first online services such 
as Facebook and twitter, and then on the night of 27 – 28 to cut off mobile 
phone  services.9 Nonetheless,  on  28  January,  in  Cairo  alone  hundreds  of 
thousands of protesters marched on the streets, chanting the by now well know 
slogan that  united their  demands,  from the  economic  to  the political  –  “the 
people want the overthrow of the regime”.10 This day also marks the first day of 
the ‘capturing of Tahrir, which was to remain in protesters’ hands throughout the 
revolution until the day President Mubarak finally stepped down on the 11 th of 
February. The regime itself, shaken in its self-confidence by the Sidi Bouzid 
Revolution that culminated in the ouster of President Ben Ali on January 14th 
2011 in Tunisia, reacted by oscillating between the tried and tested tactics of 
repression, mixed with concessions, when Mubarak on his first speech in the 
night from January 28th to the 29th offered the dismissal of the hugely unpopular 
Nazif government. That same day, Omar Suleiman, former security chief was 
appointed the first vice president of Egypt under Mubarak, putting the nail to 
the  coffin  that  was  the  rumored  aspirations  of  the  President’s  son,  Gamal 
Mubarak’s, bid for power in the 2011 presidential elections. At the same time as 
Egypt’s police withdrew from the streets, the military started to appear in Cairo 
and  other  Egyptian  Cities,  while  as  some claimed,  the  state  had effectively 
ceased  to  exist  in  Egypt’s  countryside,  where  state  presence  had  been 
traditionally weak” (Crisis Group 2011, 5).
While the regime was thus struggling to find the right strategy to deal 
with  the  protests,  the  occupation  of  Tahrir  square  was  in  full  swing,  with 
thousands having set up camp and participants ranging from rich to poor, across 
the political spectrum, and across religious divides. On 1 February President 
Mubarak gave yet another speech in which he not only offered constitutional 
amendments long sought after by Egypt’s opposition forces, but also promised 
to not run again in the upcoming presidential elections, staying instead to guide 
meetings, and only five people who knew the full plan, each directing a group of a further 20 activists. These 
groups were to then start protests from separate locations, joining up later. In the run up to this day, activists 
distributed flyers instructing people on ‘How to Revolt’ which detailed not only their demands, but also strategic 
goals like the “seizure of key government buildings” or the “attempt to incorporate police and military officers 
into the ranks”, down to appropriate clothing (goggles, scarves, comfortable shoes, flowers as signs of 
peacefulness) through trusted e-mail networks according to a snowball system. 
8Crisis Group report, p. 3
9The tactic of the regime to cut communication networks in an effort to keep people at home dramatically 
backfired in this context. Many people were already on the streets for prayers, and those that were not came out 
onto the streets simply to get information on what was happening on the ground.
10Crisis Group, p. 4
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a peaceful transition process in the six months till the elections were to take 
place.11 This speech shifted the balance in Mubarak’s favor for a short moment, 
or as one activist observed, after this speech, “had there been a referendum on 
the  presidency,  Mubarak  would  have  won”.12 Thus,  while  the  numbers 
protesting in Cairo and other cities  at  points approached millions (some say 
about 12 million were involved overall), the President managed to garner the 
support of many.13 Events on the following day shifted the balance back in favor 
of the protests again however, as the now infamous “battle of the camel” saw 
largely  peaceful  anti-regime  protests  in  Tahrir  attacked  by  pro-Mubarak 
supporters mounted on horses and camels and armed with knives, sticks, and 
clubs.14 Subsequently, on 5 February, in a desperate bid to save what could be 
saved,  the  President’s  son,  the  widely  unpopular  Gamal  Mubarak,  finally 
resigned,  and with him the entire leadership of the equally unpopular  ruling 
National Democratic Party. The party that had effectively stopped operating at 
the start of the revolution was now left head- and leaderless. The cessation of 
violence as well as a widely publicized and highly emotional interview with 
Wael Ghoneim15 which provoked an overwhelming amount of sympathy led to a 
swelling of the protesters’ ranks on 7 and 8 February, days which saw some of 
the largest crowds in Tahrir and Cairo since the start of the revolution.16 These 
last days were characterized by a back and forth between the protesters and the 
regime, intertwined in a stalemate where protesters had become trapped inside 
the  square,  fearful  of  the  consequences  and  indeed  what  they  perceived  as 
inevitable revenge on those who had organized the protests should they leave 
Tahrir before the regime stepped down, and the government tried a mixture of 
intimidation  and  partial  concessions  in  a  bid  to  split  the  opposition  on  the 
square.17 However, on 9 and 10 February the workers’ call for a general strike 
shifted the balance yet again in favor of the protesters, sealing the fate of the 
regime. Thus, many believe that it was the workers’ involvement in the protests, 
paralyzing what  was  left  of  the  economy, that  led  the  military,  and  its 
representative in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), to finally 
side against the regime, and pressure Mubarak to step down from power.18 After 
renewed mass demonstrations on 11 February Mubarak finally stepped down at 
4 in the afternoon via an announcement by Vice President Omar Suleiman. 
11The Guardian, Hosni Mubarak's speech: full text, 02.02.2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/02/president-hosni-mubarak-egypt-speech.
12Interview with activist, Cairo, 09.05.2011
13Interview with activist, Cairo, 09.05.2011
14Al Jazeera: Timeline: Egypt’s Revolution, 14.02.2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/NEWS/MIDDLEEAST/2011/01/201112515334871490.html
15The leader behind the Arabic facebook page ‘We are all Khaled Said’. The interview took place after his 
release from prison after a 12 day detention
16Al Jazeera : Timeline: Egypt’s Revolution, 14.02.2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/NEWS/MIDDLEEAST/2011/01/201112515334871490.html
17Interview with activist, Cairo, 28.04.11
18Interview with activists, Cairo, 28.04.11, 09.05.11, 07.05.11, see also: Jadaliyyah, English translation of 
interview with Hossam El-Hamalawy on the role of labor/unions in the Egyptian revolution, 30.04.11
10
Egypt’s uneasy transition (February 2011 – January 2012)
While  the  protests  spanning  from 25  January  to  11  February  achieved  the 
unthinkable and removed Mubarak from power, this turned out to be the ‘easy’ 
part of what many hoped would culminate in Egypt’s transition to a sustainable 
democratic system. The country now moved into an uneasy period of military 
rule in which deep fault lines between political forces and between them and the 
military came to the fore. Thus, almost a year after the fall of Mubarak, while 
the country held its first mostly free and fair elections, it also witnessed some of 
the worst clashes between protesters and security forces since the revolution, 
with the military all  the while engaging in a prolonged clampdown on civil 
society and the free press. 
The red thread running through this period of increasing political crisis 
was the continuing efforts, especially of young revolutionaries and leftist forces, 
to press for their demands via regular protests. These protests, usually scheduled 
for Fridays, initially started out as a way to celebrate the achievements of the 
revolution,  then  later  pushed  for  the  fulfillment  of  additional  demands. 
However, even though some activists remained suspicious of the military even 
as temporary rulers of the country from the very start of the transition process, 
the majority of protesters continued in their endeavor in a cooperative spirit. 
Protests were less a way of challenging the new authorities and more a tried and 
tested  way  of  achieving  particular  demands.  Their  success  record  initially 
seemed to prove them right, with the military compromising on demands such 
as  the  trial  of  high-ranking  regime  officials  and  even  Mubarak  and  his 
immediate family.19 However, as early as April, the SCAF also started to use 
more heavy handed tactics for dealing with protesters, resulting in the end of an 
unofficial consultation process between the military and several youth groups, 
including 6 April as well as several members of the Youth Revolution Coalition, 
on 10 April 2011.20 Up until the elections, this period is thus interspersed with 
several attempts at a ‘second revolutionary wave’ to kick-start the democratic 
process  that  many  youth  activists  had  become  increasingly  frustrated  with. 
Protests such as the “Second  Friday of Anger” on May 27th to press for the trial 
of  Mubarak,  his  family and his  associates were held in this spirit,  part  of a 
“pattern  whereby  demonstrations  are  called  almost  every  time  a  decision  is 
made deemed incompatible with the will of the revolutionary forces”21. While 
these protests  were still  somewhat  successful,  they also revealed deep splits 
within  the  ‘revolutionary  forces’  whereby  most  of  the  youth  movement 
organizations  and  large  parts  of  the  political  movements  were  in  favor  of 
protests, while Islamist and conservative forces were mostly against. Thus, the 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB), even though its youth wing especially formed an 
integral part of the revolution itself, and was one of its primary beneficiaries, 
19Al Ahram Weekly, No 1047, One hundred heady days, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1047/eg20.htm
20Al Ahram Weekly, No 1050, Unity remains elusive, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1050/eg1.htm
21Al Ahram Weekly, No 1049, Revolution’s second wave, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1049/fr1.htm
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more often than not opposed the ongoing protests together with various Salafist 
and  more  fundamentalist  Islamist  groups.  Instead,  like  many  of  the  more 
established political  forces,  they advocated a  return to  the  ‘normal’ political 
process  and  a  focus  on  organizing  and  preparing  for  the  upcoming 
parliamentary elections, scheduled for fall 2011. In this respect the MB shared 
the interests of the SCAF, which during this time had successfully fended off the 
demands  of  many  political  forces  to  write  a  constitution  before  choosing  a 
parliament.22 Instead,  the  demanding  requirements  for  getting  a  new  party 
licensed kept political actors busy. 
All through June it  seemed like the SCAF’s calculations had paid off, 
with no major protests taking place. This was to change, however, by the end of 
June,  when  the  fire  was  reignited  by  clashes  between  the  military  and  the 
families of ‘martyrs’ who had died during the revolution, who demanded trials 
for Mubarak and state officials involved in the killing of protesters, as well as 
the payment of financial compensation promised by the government after the 
revolution.  These  clashes  ushered in  the ‘second wave of  the  revolution’,  a 
prolonged sit in which would see Midan Tahrir blocked for weeks and starting 
on 8 July, the ‘Friday of Reckoning’, when a number of youth groups together 
with more established political actors and even the Muslim Brotherhood staged 
protests to save the revolution, driven by their “fear that the revolution is not 
materializing in line with the aspirations that followed the toppling of Hosni 
Mubarak”.23 According to news sources, however, these protests did not involve 
more  than  20  000  people  and  after  the  initial  protest  on  8  July,  mostly 
comprised  by a  mixture  of  young revolutionaries  with  leftist  or  progressive 
backgrounds, ordinary Egyptians with a hodgepodge of grievances, and dozens 
of  street  vendors  that  had  become a  permanent  presence  in  Tahrir  after  the 
revolution.24 Not only did the tone get harsher and more anti-military on the side 
of  the  protesters,  the  SCAF  also  became  increasingly  irritated  as  became 
manifest in Communique No 69 in which they accused 6 April and Kifaya of 
treason,  being trained by foreigners,  spreading rumors,  and driving a  wedge 
between the army and the people. This sit-in lasted till 1 August, the first day of 
Ramadan, when the military moved into Midan Tahrir to forcefully evict the 
remaining protesters who had set up camp in the square, a move which was, 
according to observers, supported by a majority of Egyptians who had grown 
weary with the continued blockage of Cairo’s central traffic hub.25 
This was only a prelude to the clashes that were to follow during the fall 
and  early  winter  months  however.  While  the  month  of  Ramadan  remained 
comparatively  quiet,  September  not  only  saw  renewed  clashes  between  the 
army and protesters on 9 September, but also a resurgent nationwide strike wave 
22Al Ahram Weekly, No 1049, Another revolution? http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1049/eg10.htm
23Al Ahram Weekly, No 1055, Back in tahrir, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1055/fr1.htm
24Al Ahram Weekly, No 1057, Back to square one, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1057/eg1.htm
25Al Ahram Weekly, No 1058, A revolution in peril, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1058/eg31.htm
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in the public sector, starting from 17 September.26 
The  events  of  9  September  marked  the  first  in  a  series  of  escalating 
protests  in  which  the  SCAF,  rather  than  being  the  addressee  of  particular 
demands related to the transition process, came to be the actual target of the 
protests, with protesters increasingly focusing on the handover of power to a 
civil  authority  at  the  earliest  possible  time,  the  removal  of  Field  Marshal 
Hussein Tantawi, and an end to military trials. These events, which at this point 
marked  the  most  violent  1  million  man  march  so  far,  also  indicated  the 
increasingly  violent  character  of  the  confrontation  between  mostly  young 
protesters and the military.27 They also resulted in the extension and expansion 
of the state of emergency by the SCAF, who had previously announced that 
while they respected the right to protest, they would not provide security.28 With 
the gloves thus off on both sides, the coming months were to witness three more 
protest events turn ugly in a climate of deepening political crisis that saw the 
Islamists, whose reluctance to get involved in protests in favor of a focus on the 
electoral process paid off, win a resounding victory at the ballot box. Events 
took a turn for the worse on October 9th, when during what has been dubbed the 
‘Maspero Massacre’ 25 protesters died in an army crackdown on Copts and civil 
society activists protesting against the demolition of a Coptic church.29 In the 
wake of these events followed the intensification of what can only be described 
as  a  crackdown on  civil  society  in  general,  with  critical  newspaper  articles 
banned,  bloggers  persecuted  and  civil  society  organizations  harassed.30 The 
spiral  of  escalation intensified again a  month later  when the army violently 
cleared remaining protesters, mostly consisting of the relatives and families of 
martyrs  who  had  died  during  the  revolution,  from  Midan  Tahrir.  In  the 
following days Midan Tahrir  and the streets bordering the square,  especially 
Mohamed Mahmoud Street, turned into a battleground between the army and a 
renewed  surge  of  protesters  angered  by  the  violent  treatment  of  martyrs’ 
families. The battle raged for days, ultimately leaving at least 45 protesters dead 
and over 1000 injured.31 The last confrontation in this increasingly violent series 
of  protests  challenging  military  rule  (at  the  time  of  writing)  took  place  on 
December  16th in  front  of  the Cabinet  Office  in  Qasr  Al  Aini  Street,  where 
clashes  erupted  after  the  army  forcefully  cleared  a  month  old  sit-in.  These 
clashes left at least 17 protesters dead, and also provoked international criticism 
when pictures surfaced of army personnel beating and stripping women.32  
26Al Ahram Weekly, No 1066, Strikes continue, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1066/eg8.htm
27Al Ahram Weekly, No 1064, Sidelined or in the lead? http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1064/eg09.htm
28Al Ahram Weekly, No 1065, Tahrir fatigue, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1065/eg08.htm
29Al Ahram Weekly, No .1068, ‘We did not kill protesters’, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1068/eg01.htm
30Al Ahram Weekly, No 1070, Censorship revived? http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1070/eg8.htm
31Al Ahram Weekly, No 1073, Revolution – part II, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1073/eg3.htm
32Al Ahram Weekly, No 1078, The challenges ahead, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1078/eg11.htm
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Structural Conditions
In  examining  the  structural  conditions  in  which  the  revolution  and  the 
subsequent  transition  process  were  embedded  and  which  constrained  and 
shaped their structure and outcome, one has to differentiate between genuinely 
political conditions such as the type of authoritarian regime the protesters faced, 
as well as the social and economic conditions that underlie political institutional 
factors. What is particularly interesting in this case is the fact that while the 
political  conditions  of  authoritarian  rule  had  remained  largely  unchanged  in 
recent  decades,  and  thus  represent  a  rather  static  image  of  the  structural 
conditions,  the  social  and  economic  conditions  underwent  profound 
transformations, thereby altering the socio-structural make up of regime support 
and incorporation. These changes left the regime of Husni Mubarak increasingly 
vulnerable to challenges to its rule by alienating it from most sectors of society, 
save  a  small  circle  of  business  elites,  which  in  the  end  turned  out  to  be 
insufficient to sustain its rule. 
The Husni Mubarak regime may be classified in several ways, as indeed 
it  has  been.  Thus,  with  reference  to  the  military  background  of  the  late 
President, the regime has been qualified as military by some observers (Gandhi 
2008), whereas others (Hadenius and Teorell 2007), looking at the presence of 
formal institutions, have classified it as a limited multiparty regime. However, 
taking into account the mere window dressing of formal institutions such as 
political  parties,  parliaments  etc.  for  the  underlying  power  arrangements  in 
Egypt,  these  classifications  seem  to  hold  limited  explanatory  power  to  a) 
understand actual structures of power, as well as b) their relation to the events 
per se, as well as the specific actor constellations that drove them. A slightly 
different path will thus be followed in classifying Egypt as a (post populist) 
personalist regime. 
Personalism refers to a regime type in which political power  is highly 
centralized, where informal modes of decision making prevail, and clientelism 
structures the relations between the political elite and the populace (see Bratton 
& van de Walle 1997, Pawelka 1985). In these regimes, the personalist leader is 
the  center  of  political  power  and  at  the  helm  of  the  political  system.  But 
whereas  the  president  might  accrue  vast  formal  powers,  in  effect  this  is  a 
manifestation of underlying structures of power, with the president standing at 
the top of a pyramidal structure of personal authority bound together by a vast 
network of patron-client relations (Pawelka 1985: 34; Jackson & Rosberg 1982: 
22, Roth 1968: 196; also: Snyder 1992; Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 65-66). 
Since the system is  highly personalized,  power  within it  is  accorded less  to 
formal offices as to those most loyal, and those closest to the ruler or his family 
(Eisenstadt  1973:  15).  In  contrast  to  Weber’s  concept  of  patrimonialism,  of 
which personalism (or neopatrimonialism as it is also often called) is a modern 
form,  personalist  regimes  are  often  highly  institutionalized,  with  a  vast 
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bureaucracy, and all the trappings of modern political systems such as political 
parties, parliaments, and constitutions. However, these institutions play quite a 
different role to their formal counterparts in democracies, since they serve as 
channels for clientelism and patronage, as a means of authoritarian control and 
elite management (Koehler 2008). 
Since the formation of the multiparty system under President Sadat in 
1976,  regular  multiparty  elections  for  parliament  have  taken place  in  Egypt 
since 1979 (Beattie 2000: 241), making elections a regular feature of Egyptian 
political  life.  However,  not  once  during  that  time  has  the  ruling  party,  the 
National Democratic Party (NDP), achieved less than a comfortable two thirds 
majority in parliament – from 87 % in 1984 to 77 % in 1987, 81 % in 1990, 94 
% in 1995, 87 % in 2000, and 70 % in 2005. While the NDP was thus ultimately 
part of the regime, an instrument of parliamentary control as well as a channel 
for clientelistic inclusion in the spoils of the regime, opposition parties did exist. 
Of the 21 official parties, however, only five can be seen as somewhat relevant: 
the liberal  Hizb al-Wafd, the leftist  Hizb al-Tagammu', the Nasserist  Hizb al-
Nasseri,  the  liberal  Hizb al-'Amal,  and  Hizb al-Ghad (Stacher  2004,  216f.). 
These opposition parties, their formal status notwithstanding, played on a tightly 
restricted and massively skewed playing field, with restrictions ranging from 
outright repression, the use of formal laws and regulations, to the ultimate tool 
of emergency laws, in place since Sadat’s assassination in 1981. Thus, while 
they were allowed to play some part in the political life of Egypt, those parties 
that did gain formal status may oftentimes more adequately be described as a 
form of ‘loyal’ opposition that played according to the rules of the game the 
regime set in exchange for a limited amount of votes and access to spoils, with 
one of the few exceptions to this being the illegal, partly tolerated, but just as 
often repressed Muslim Brotherhood. The same observations moreover applied 
to Egypt’s associational life in general. (Albrecht 2005)
Thus, while party politics in one form or another were part of Egypt’s 
political  life  at  least  since  Sadat  took  over  the  leadership  of  the  country 
following Nasser’s death, the socio-economic basis of regime support changed 
significantly  over  the  years,  with  profound  consequences  for  its  survival. 
Without  going  into  too  much  historical  detail,  from  the  military  coup  that 
brought Gamal Abdel Nasser to power in 1952 onwards the basis upon which 
the regime built its legitimacy via the more or less selective incorporation of 
key sectors of society became increasingly narrow, essentially leaving it with a 
significant  lack  of  legitimacy  within  and  hence  control  over  society.  Under 
Nasser,  what has commonly been described as a social  contract  between the 
regime and the people was instituted that  guaranteed basic  social  standards, 
jobs,  and  food  in  exchange  for  political  acquiescence  via  corporatist 
incorporation coupled with the strong repression of those that did not accept the 
boundaries  of  the  system.  Thus,  Nasser’s  regime,  while  initially  ruled  by  a 
clique of military men, later turned to what were essentially populist-corporatist 
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mechanisms in order to sustain and deepen its rule, enacting land reforms to 
redistribute  land  to  poor  farmers  -  aimed  at  disempowering  the  previously 
influential landed classes - building corporatist labor unions that imposed tight 
controls on labor activity, while at the same time increasing the living standards 
of workers by establishing a job guarantee for university graduates. This was 
done essentially by grossly inflating the public sector, while at the same time 
banning political parties. Thus, 
“by  the  end  of  the  Nasserist  period,  the  public  sector  had  dominated  all 
economic activities, except agriculture and retail trade. In 1970/71 it accounted 
for 74 per cent of industrial production, 46.1 per cent of all production, 90 per 
cent of investments and 35.2 per cent of GDP” (Ayubi 2001, 199-200).
Thus Nasser’s form of Arab Socialism, while highly repressive on the political 
front,  at  the  same  time  improved  the  living  conditions  of  the  working  and 
middle classes, and arguably to some extent also for peasants: 
“All foreign enterprises and large and medium-sized Egyptian enterprises were 
nationalized. Their workers became state employees whose standard of living, 
along  with  many middle  class  Egyptians,  improved  markedly.  Public-sector 
workers  received  extensive  social  benefits,  such  as  health  care;  access  to 
consumer  cooperatives,  which  sold  subsidized  food  and  other  basic 
commodities; subsidized housing; pensions; the right to elect representatives to 
management boards of all public enterprises; and an annual cash distribution of 
3 percent of the profits  of public-sector firms. The minimum wage of many 
workers was doubled. Real wages increased by one-third from 1960 to 1964, 
while  the  number  of  weekly  hours  of  work  declined  by  10  percent.  The 
government guaranteed all university graduates a white collar job and all high 
school  graduates  a  blue  collar  job.  Firing  a  public-sector  worker  required  a 
review by a committee including representatives of the union, the Ministry of 
Labor, and management” (Solidarity Center 2010, 11-12).
This was to change under Sadat. From a historical point of view, the current 
workers’ movement in Egypt represents a long-term consequence of the infitah 
(opening) policies initiated by Anwar al-Sadat in the 1970s (see Pawelka 1985, 
Waterbury 1983). Aiming to open the Egyptian economy to the forces of the 
world market, this reorientation ultimately led to the dismantling of large parts 
of  the  public  sector,  and  to  the  rise  of  new  crony  capitalist  elites  closely 
affiliated with the ruling circles (Baker 1990, Beattie 2000, Kienle 2003). While 
narrowing the basis for regime incorporation on an economic level, Sadat at the 
same time broadened the basis of political inclusion. In 1976 he split up the 
ruling  party  into  three  different  political  streams,  and  established  a  formal 
multiparty system. Since 1979 regular multiparty parliamentary elections, albeit 
marred with irregularities, repression and fraud, have taken place (Beattie 2000: 
241). 
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Things  changed again under  Mubarak,  partly  as  the result  of  external 
necessities, and partly due to the rise of parts of the new business elites not only 
to economic but also to political power from the early 2000s onwards in the 
wake of Gamal Mubarak’s promotion to important positions in the ruling party. 
This process found its preliminary climax in the formation of the Ahmed Nazif 
government  in 2004, which included many members of  the Gamal-affiliated 
business elite such as Rashid Muhammad Rashid and Mahmud Mohi al-Din as 
Minister for Trade and Minister for Investment respectively (Collombier 2007, 
Hassabo 2005). This change in the incorporation strategy had its roots in the 
1990s, when Egypt first started to enact structural economic reforms, pushed by 
an agreement with the International Monetary Fund that led to a first,  albeit 
circumscribed wave of privatization. However, with the rise of Gamal Mubarak 
to an increasingly prominent position in the ruling party, and with him many 
foreign educated economic reformers, privatization sped up significantly from 
2004 onwards. At the same time, the political sphere and indeed basic liberties 
in general contracted significantly. Hence while Nasser limited political liberties 
and participation while increasing economic incorporation,  Sadat  shifted this 
balance  towards  more  participation  for  less  economic  incorporation,  and 
Mubarak in the end circumscribed both, leaving not only the lower classes, but 
also the middle classes increasingly impoverished. Repression also heightened 
significantly, to a degree where it seemed arbitrary even to people not usually 
involved with the political sphere. In parallel to the contraction of the political 
and  economic  sphere  by  the  2000s,  international  and  regional  phenomena 
moved many Egyptians. The second Palestinian Intifada, the US led war on Iraq 
as  well  as  its  broader  Middle  East  campaign  thus  set  the  tone  on  the 
international front, whereby Egypt was an essential ally in the region for the US 
on the one hand, but this role was, on the other, frowned upon by the domestic 
audience (Sharp 2005). In this decade of a tightening domestic sphere combined 
with a troubled regional and international environment lay the foundations of 
what can be called the ‘resuscitation’ of Egyptian civil society from the 2000s 
onwards,  as  will  be  discussed  in  the  section  on  contingent  political 
opportunities.
Contingent Political Opportunities
The  exploration  of  contingent  political  opportunities,  similarly  to  the  part 
exploring protest events as such, will be subdivided into two parts. The first will 
chronicle  the  changes  in  political  opportunities  that  shaped  the  opposition 
landscape in the period running up to the breakdown of authoritarianism and the 
fall of Husni Mubarak. While the causal factors in this first period are to a much 
greater extent located in the past, stretching over a significant amount of time, 
the causal factors of the second period – the period of an uneasy transition with 
an unknown outcome – will run more in parallel to the protest events that make 
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up the  main  cornerstones  of  the  second period.  Thus,  the  part  covering the 
causal  conditions  of  the  first  period  is  much  more  elaborate  and  lengthy, 
whereas  less  space  will  be  devoted  to  chronicle  the  causal  triggers  and 
mechanisms of the second period due to its brevity.
A decade of dissent  – a tale of the intermediate conditions of an unfinished  
revolution
The  first  decade  of  the  new  millennium  witnessed  substantial  changes  in 
Egypt’s political sphere during which social structural changes combined with 
contingent events  to transfigure political  opportunities.  Thus,  embedded in a 
changing  media  landscape,  the  increasing  political  and  economic 
marginalization of large strata of society (including the middle class), as well as 
heightened  state  repression,  was  the  formation  of  mobilizing  structures  of 
political activism, that is the building of coalitions between different opposition 
parties  and figures culminating in the development  of  the protest  movement 
Kifaya in 2005, and finally events such as the brutal murder of Khaled Said that 
would  turn  middle  class  frustration  into  outrage,  making  them increasingly 
available for mobilization via newly developing forms of internet activism in 
combination with street action. 
By most activist accounts the tale of the resuscitation of Egypt’s civil and 
political  society  after  the  relative  calm of  the  1990s  starts  with  the  second 
Palestinian  Intifada  in  2000.  It  is  a  tale  of  renewed  cycles  of  mobilization 
throughout the decade, often with foreign policy oriented backgrounds as in the 
case of the Intifada, the war in Iraq, Israel’s war in Lebanon, the Gaza blockade 
etc.,  but  it  is  also one that  increasingly involves national  politics,  especially 
from  2004  onwards  with  the  emergence  of  Kifaya,  to  the  (oftentimes 
pejoratively called particularistic even by democracy activists) workers’ strikes 
from 2006 onwards,  and  finally to what can be called the mobilization of the 
middle classes via the campaign in support of Mohamed El-Baradei, and the 
case of the brutal murder of Khaled Said.  It is a tale of emerging networks of 
activists interconnected through cross-cutting participation within the different 
movements  that  sprang  up  during  that  decade  and  that  socialized  a  new 
generation of activists, as well as reactivated 1970s student activists that had 
dropped  out  of  politics  in  the  meantime.  They  thus  set  the  stage  on  which 
alliances between different actors crystallized in opposition to the regime and 
action repertoires were shaped amongst opposition actors. 
The  initial  mobilization  impetus  from  the  support  groups  of  the 
Palestinian  Intifada  politicized  many,  especially  at  universities  around  the 
country,  and led to a revival  of  activism which ultimately converged in late 
2004  and  throughout  2005  in  what  some  have  termed  the  ‘Caireen  Spring’ 
during  which  multiple  protest  movements  sprang  up  to  protest  the  lack  of 
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democracy  in  view  of  the  upcoming  ‘election  year’.33 The  most  vocal  and 
prominent  of  these  was  the  Egyptian  Movement  for  Change  (al-Haraka  al-
Masriyya min agli-l-Taghiir), or Kifaya (Enough!), a largely urban, middle class 
based pro-reform movement.34 While Kifaya was thus able to capitalize to some 
extent on a pre-existing level of mobilization when it emerged in 2004, it also 
innovated on existing forms of protest mobilization by, for example, breaking 
the taboo of directly criticizing the President,  his family,  or members of the 
ruling elite. Hence, one of the most frequently heard slogans at early Kifaya 
protests  was  “batil  Husni  Mubarak,  batil  al-intikhabat”.35 Accordingly,  the 
security  presence at  Kifaya’s first  public  appearance in December 2004 was 
heavy,  with  police  and  security  forces  almost  outnumbering  the  protesters 
themselves. While  the  movement’s  demands  also  addressed  Arab  nationalist 
issues directed towards the international arena, its  domestic demands mainly 
centered on ‘more democracy for Egypt,’ a minimal consensus that had not been 
easily won. It was this basic demand, however, that made it resonate within the 
opposition sphere, and arguably also in the international and to a lesser extent 
national media: 
“All  of  this  [demonstrations  against  the  war  on  Iraq]  coincided  with  the 
democracy project of the Bush administration. In Arab newspapers there were 
huge debates about the future of democracy and whether it would come to the 
region by way of US tanks. This in a way laid the ground for debates later in 
2003 and all through 2004 that led to the recognition that democracy indeed was 
the  missing  link.  The  idea  of  democracy  and  of  moving  against  Mubarak 
became  central  to  the  movement.  Kifaya  from  this  perspective  was  the 
culmination of this process of ideological radicalization. In this sense, Kifaya 
was also a historical necessity. All the objective circumstances were pushing in 
this direction. The genius of Kifaya thus was its timing, not its name as some 
others have suggested”.36
The opposition figures that signed Kifaya’s first official declaration came from 
across the political spectrum, and the composition of the activists that took to 
the streets under the banner of Kifaya was similarly diverse.  Yet there were 
considerable differences in the strength of involvement of opposition political 
parties. Whereas the officially licensed opposition parties were only meagerly 
represented,  those  parties  not  enjoying  formal  recognition  were  particularly 
33The following description of the rise and fall of Kifaya, as well as the development of the workers’ movement 
(up to page 18) first appeared in Koehler and Warkotsch 2009
34Kifaya held its founding conference on September 22 2004, in parallel with the annual conference of the ruling 
NDP. Their first demonstration took place on December 12 2004. 
35The slogan is probably best translated as “illegitimate: Husni Mubarak, illegitimate: the elections,” with the 
verb “batala” literally meaning “to be void and invalid.” The slogan was commonly extended to include 
members of the president’s family such as Suzanne, Gamal, and ‘Ala Mubarak, but also especially hated public 
officials such as Interior Minister Habib al-‘Adli or institutions such as the State Security Services (‘Amn al-
Dawla). 
36Interview with activist, Cairo, 7 May 2011.
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active. Examples from this second category include Hizb al-Karama (Dignity 
Party), a party with Nasserist leanings, Hizb al-Wasat (Center Party), an Islamist 
leaning party which had been fighting for formal recognition for some years, 
and Hizb al-‘Amal (Labor Party), a socialist-turned-Islamist party which had 
been ‘frozen’ by the state in 2000. Of the officially recognized parties, younger 
activists of Hizb al-Tagammu' (National Progressive Unionist Party, NPUP) and 
Hizb  al-Ghad  (Tomorrow  Party)  were  prominent,  while  the  establishment 
sectors  of  those  parties  remained  visibly  absent.  A  significant  number  of 
younger activists also came from groups with strong leftist leanings, such as the 
Trotskyite  Revolutionary  Socialists  (al-Ishtirakiin  al-Thawriin)  and  activists 
involved with the Socialist Studies Center (Markaz al-Dirasat al-Ishtirakiyya). 
Most of these younger activists were joined in a sub-organization called “Youth 
for Change” (al-Shabab min agli-l-Taghrir).37
The tactical  consideration behind the staging of  illegal  demonstrations 
was to discredit the regime in the eyes of the national public as well as vis-à-vis 
international observers and allies. Public criticism from a pro-democratic protest 
movement was intended to unmask the regime’s pseudo-democratic façade and 
expose its essential lack of popular support.38 2005 was an ideal year for such 
purposes.  With  the  country’s  first  multi-candidate  presidential  elections39 in 
September and parliamentary elections scheduled for October and November, 
2005 was a ‘big election year’ in Egypt. Kifaya focused on these prominent 
political events in their slogans and demonstrations and, despite select instances 
of  sometimes  severe  repression,  the  security  forces  overall  treated  the 
movement with surprising lenience.40
Kifaya’s  ascension  on  the  political  scene  in  Egypt  in  2005  signalled 
several shifts in contingent opportunities. With respect to actor constellations, it 
signified the increasing impatience of the younger, middle class parts of the 
opposition  with  playing  the  tame  counterpart  to  a  repressive  regime  which 
denied them access via formal channels  of  participation (exemplified by the 
now legalized Hizb al-Wasat, which had been trying to gain legal recognition 
for years without success). Thus, amongst the (usually in-fighting) opposition, 
some more significant  splits  appeared,  separating those who continued to be 
loyal from those willing to contest the regime more openly. What is more, by 
37 Youth for Change had originally been designed to facilitate communication and coordination between 
Kifaya and various leftist student groups.
38Interview with leading member of Kifaya, October 18 2005, Cairo.
39 The initial target for protest was the presidential referendum scheduled for the fall of 2005. This explains 
Kifaya’s original slogan of “la li-l-tawrith, la li-l-tamdid” (no to inheritance, no to extension). When in a 
surprise move in the spring of 2005 multi-candidate presidential elections were announced, Kifaya 
denounced these elections.
40 One of the most severe incidents took place at a demonstration on 25 May 2005. This instance attracted 
widespread attention because plain-clothes thugs, associated with the security forces, specifically targeted 
female demonstrators. This incident proved consequential for Kifaya, the resulting international outcry was 
instrumental in significantly reducing the repression and violence with which demonstrations were met. It 
also provided the movement with additional energy and weekly demonstrations almost took on the character 
of a tradition.
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forming Kifaya and engaging in protracted protests over the course of 2005, 
these  opposition  actors  also  set  an  important  precedent  showcasing  that 
contesting  the  regime  was  possible  (since  this  had  not  been  part  of  the 
opposition repertoire before), hence altering the very opportunities that protest 
actors were to encounter in the future. But it also signified something beyond 
actor constellations – a profound change in Egypt’s media landscape, one that 
was not caused by Kifaya itself, but that helped spread its news. These changes 
were threefold. First, the rise of satellite television such as Al-Jazeera enabled 
even  small  and  relatively  impotent  movements  to  reach  an  international 
audience made up of governments, human rights NGOs, and pressure groups. 
Second,  in  Egypt’s  tightly  controlled  media  landscape,  where  most  TV and 
radio stations and newspapers were state owned, some relaxations of control 
was  seen  from 2004  onwards  with  the  introduction  of  the  privately  owned 
newspaper Al Masry Al Youm and several more in its wake, which then grew 
increasingly  influential  in  proving  independent  news  and  giving  opposition 
opinions an outlet. Third, the internet and with it phenomena such as blogging, 
online news, and later on twitter and Facebook gained notoriety as a new and 
promising way of expressing dissent to an extent that was previously unknown. 
However important these changes might have been in the long run, in the 
short run they did not enable the opposition to gain any significant advantage at 
the parliamentary elections of 2005.  The aftermath of the astounding losses of 
the opposition - expected in fact if not in extent - in the 2005 parliamentary 
elections was characterized by a period of crisis.  Kifaya all  but  disappeared 
from the political scene, while the opposition parties were further weakened by 
internal conflict. Drawing its own lessons from the elections, in early 2006 the 
state started to crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood, opposition journalists, 
and judges that had become too outspoken over the judicial supervision of the 
elections (Wolff 2009). In particular the case of judges Mahmoud Mekki and 
Hisham Bastawisi led, starting in May 2006, to renewed mobilization in support 
of their cause. In marked contrast to the restraint the security forces had shown 
in  2005,  however,  this  time  the  activists  met  with  severe  repression.  As  a 
consequence at least 55 Kifaya activists were arrested and faced trumped-up 
charges ranging from illegal assembly to disturbing public order.41 Thus while 
the years 2004 and 2005 seemed the culmination of a revived civil society, with 
multiple protest movements calling for democracy blossoming, this scene was 
in disarray only a year later, and not only due to increased repression by the 
regime, but also because their strategy for mobilizing for change had essentially 
failed to reach the people and lead to any significant amount of change. 
However, the demise of the political protest movements after 2006 was 
far from the end of protest mobilization per se. Instead, Egypt witnessed one of 
the most  sustained fully  fledged workers’ mobilizations since World War II, 
41Al-Ahram Weekly, No. 794, 11-17 May 2006, Stamp of Authority, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/794/eg5.htm
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involving at least 1.8 million workers at one time or another. This wave started 
in the traditional hotspot of labor mobilization, the industrial city of Mahalla al 
Kubra, where in 2006 24 000 workers went on strike over unpaid bonuses (El-
Mahdi 2011). The period between 2004 and 2008 alone saw about 1900 strikes, 
which 
“spread  from their  center  of  gravity  in  the  textile  and  clothing  industry  to 
encompass  building  materials  workers,  transport  workers,  the  Cairo 
underground  Metro  workers,  food  processing  workers,  bakers,  sanitation 
workers, oil workers in Suez, and many others. In the summer [of 2007] the 
movement broadened to encompass white collar employees and civil servants” 
(Solidarity Center 2010, 14).
In August 2007, an estimated 20 000 teachers followed, as well as employees of 
the Cairo Metro, and female workers at the Mansoura-Espana textile factory, to 
name but  a  few.  Workers’ mobilizations reached an unprecedented height in 
2007, with 590 incidents of collective action reported, compared to 222 in 2006, 
and with a total amount of workers involved ranging between 300 000 and 500 
000. (El Mahdi 2011, 6)
While originally focused on more classical bread and butter issues, the 
strikes took on increasingly political overtones with calls for the formation of 
independent  unions  outside  the  reach  of  the  state-controlled  official  EFTU. 
While the rise in labor activity thus coincided with the rise and concomitant 
decline of the political movements of 2004/05, there was only scant cooperation 
between the two. This lack of cooperation and coordination originated within 
both the political and the labor movements. The former, apart from having little 
contact with the labor movement to begin with (what little contact there was 
mainly took place via strategically located labor activists running labor rights 
NGOs such as Kamal Abbas), often believed that the economic demands of the 
labor movement were too particularistic  to bring about large scale  structural 
change,  and  economic  demands  alone  could  not  mobilize  large  groups  of 
people.42 Workers, who felt little affinity with the political sphere to begin with, 
sought to keep their distance from overt political activity out of fear that this 
might be perceived and portrayed as their being instrumentalized by political 
forces such as the Muslim Brotherhood, raising the chances of repression while 
lowering those of success in securing their demands:
“When demands become political, the government is afraid of interference by 
the opposition. If the demands are purely economic, the probability of success 
increases. This is because of the political elite’s mindset. The government rather 
wants to deal with strikes by asking ‘what does it cost?’”.43 
42Interview with political analyst and long time activist, Cairo, 05/13.10.2005
43Interview with labor rights activist, Cairo, 12.03.2008
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The gap between the two only started to narrow with the apparent sustainability 
and partial success of the labor movement, but it was 2008 before the remnants 
of Kifaya started to at least rhetorically reach out to the labor movement, and 
spin-offs of the youth mobilization that would later become known as the 6 
April movement made the cause of the workers their own. The key date in this 
respect is said to be 6 April 2008, the date from which the latter movement took 
its name. 6 April 2008 marked the date for which the textile workers of Mahalla 
El Kubra had called a general strike to protest working and wage conditions, a 
call that soon got taken over by political activists, to the dismay of many labor 
activists.  While  downtown  Cairo  stayed  relatively  calm,  partly  due  to  an 
overwhelming security presence, violent clashes erupted in Mahalla itself, in the 
aftermath of which many workers and activists were arrested. 
This  event  also  marked  the  first  appearance  of  the  6  April  youth 
movement,  founded  by  youth  activists  with  Hizb  Al  Ghad,  who  had  used 
Facebook to endorse the strike. While originally formed for this occasion only, 
overwhelming online resonance compelled the group to stay active beyond its 
original  purpose,  and continues today,  with members of  6 April  involved in 
organizing the previously mentioned calls for demonstrations on National Police 
Day, as well as the day that became the starting point for the revolution. Many 
more  groups  would  come  to  emulate  their  particular  formula  of  Facebook 
activism coupled with ‘real life’ events, the most prominent of which was the 
‘We are all Khaled Said’ group, which issued the original call for the revolution 
on January 25 2011. One of the characteristics of activism that followed in the 
footsteps of  the 6 April  movement,  apart  from the extensive use of  internet 
communication  tools  such  as  Facebook,  was  its  cross  ideological  nature, 
gathering people around specific demands that transcended the dividing lines 
between Islamists, leftists and liberals. Not only did they eschew the display of 
overtly  ideological  positions,  they  also  rejected  tight  coupling  with  existing 
political forces, especially the existing opposition parties, something that would 
recur in the run up to and during the revolution itself (Shehata 2008, 6). 
The next stepping stone on the way to the revolution was the substantial 
mobilization that occurred after Mohamed El-Baradei, the former head of the 
UN’s  Atomic  Agency,  hinted  at  the  possibility  of  his  running for  president, 
should the 2011 elections meet democratic standards, in an interview.44 
The publication of these statements in November 2009 led to the 6 April 
movement rallying on Facebook behind his nomination as a candidate, and to 
the formation of the National Association for Change (NAC), a group gathering 
many well know opposition activists such as former Kifaya coordinator George 
Ishaq, as well as the Coalition to Support El-Baradei, a more youth-oriented 
movement  organization that,  while  coordinating its  activities  with the NAC, 
44Al Ahram Weekly, Never say Never, 12 - 18 November 2009 Issue No. 972, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2009/972/eg4.htm
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retained its  independence.  Things really  kicked off  when El-Baradei,  after  a 
long absence from Egypt’s political scene, returned to Egypt in February 2010 
to enthusiastic support for his campaign for constitutional change in the form of 
a frenzied virtual campaign sustained by many younger activists, as well as the 
so  called  1  Million  signature  campaign  which  saw  even  the  Muslim 
Brotherhood  involved  in  collecting  signatures  for  his  reform  proposals. 
However,  while  the  El-Baradei  ‘phenomenon’  led  to  substantial  renewed 
mobilization and much hope that change was finally upon them among many 
opposition activists, the campaign lost a considerable amount of steam in the 
course of the year. Whether this was due to E-Baradei’s continued extended 
travels abroad, or his perceived unwillingness to commit to the fight for change 
in Egypt, it left many supporters disappointed. This was especially true after the 
(massively rigged) parliamentary elections in spring 2010, which according to 
observers were organized mainly by Gamal Mubarak and his clique, and which 
marked the point “when politics died” for many opposition activists.45
The last and final stepping stone on the domestic scene was the infamous 
case  of  the  death  of  Khaled  Said.  Khaled  Said  was  a  young,  middle  class 
professional, who after accidentally capturing film of police involved in drugs 
business, footage which he subsequently put up on youtube, was brutally beaten 
to death by the police. While police violence is not a rare occurrence in Egypt, 
this  case  was different  for  several  reasons  which have  to  do with  his  class 
background as well as his lack of prior involvement in political activism. As has 
been  noted  before,  police  repression  and  violence  and  impunity  from 
punishment for those who commit these acts is an everyday feature of lower 
class life in Egypt, especially for young people. At the same time this is less true 
for people of middle class background, where the assumption up until recently 
was that as long as you stayed clean and away from politics (which was dirty 
anyway), you would not have to face police brutality yourself. This perception, 
especially for young, middle class people changed with the Khaled Said case, as 
he 
“put a face to torture in Egypt, one that the activist middle class can identify. 
[…] Young kids with access  to  the internet  saw themselves in  him. He was 
known in his community, and people could no longer hide behind the mental 
veil of thinking, ‘maybe he was an actual criminal and deserved it.’ There was 
no mistake in this one. So the story was bound to resonate,”
in the words of Ahmed Seif al-Islam, a human rights lawyer and co-founder of 
the Hisham Mubarak Law Center.46 His case, and the widely circulated pictures 
of his corpse, led to the formation of the eponymous Facebook group ‘We Are 
All Khaled Said’ that expressed exactly this sentiment that ‘none of us is safe 
45Interview with activist, Cairo, 03.05.2011
46Al Masry Al Youm, Year Ender: Egypt’s torture face revealed, 31.12.2010, 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/year-ender-egypt%E2%80%99s-torture-face-revealed
24
from this, it could happen to each and every single one of us, without the police 
ever being held accountable,’ and which quickly rallied hundreds of thousands, 
the majority of whom had never been involved in politics before. 
Lastly, while the development of actor networks and alliances during the 
2000s set the stage for what was to come, the event that lit the fire for many was 
arguably what has been dubbed the Sidi Bouzid revolution in Tunisia, where the 
self-immolation  of  a  street  vendor  protesting  against  undignified  living 
conditions sparked mass protests that led to the downfall of long term dictator 
Ben Ali  on  January  14 2011.  However,  while  this  certainly  shook the  Arab 
world, and arguably provoked a shift in the perception of the ‘structuredness’ of 
the regime they were facing, it is too easy an to simply state that what went 
happened in Tunisia led to what happened in Egypt. Thus, while this example 
may have led to  many non-activists  joining the protests,  if  even just  out  of 
curiosity, the activists involved in organizing the original event that took place 
on January 25 were long term activists that had prepared the demonstration well 
before Ben Ali fled Tunisia on the 14th, and this was a call that had gone out for 
three  previous  years  (albeit  with  different  results).  It  was  thus  the  unique 
interaction  between  these  more  contingent  political  opportunities  and  the 
structural changes that had taken place over the last decades that produced the 
stunning events of the January 25 revolution. 
Contingent Political Opportunities during the Transition Period
Compared to the first revolutionary phase of the transition, protest actors in the 
second  phase  faced  a  somewhat  more  simplified  yet  significantly  less 
predictable elite structure. Thus, while some activists (especially leftists) had 
their  doubts  about  the  SCAF’s  democratic  credentials,  as  well  as  their 
willingness to institute proper democratic processes and hand over power to 
civilian authorities as soon as possible47, most former opposition actors as well 
as the wider population were willing either to give them the benefit of the doubt 
or whole heartedly embrace and support their rule. However, as shown above, 
as time wore on activists became increasingly disillusioned with the way the 
military was handling the transition process as well as the nature of the military 
rulers themselves. The military on the other hand, with their lack of patience 
with  overt  dissent  having  become  ingrained  over  the  past  decades,  were 
increasingly unwilling to tolerate continued protests – not only because regular 
Friday protests in Midan Tahrir brought one of Cairo’s central traffic hubs to a 
standstill on a regular basis, but also and particularly because they viewed the 
continued protests as a sign of disrespect for their role during the revolution and 
for them as an institution as such. Together these factors led to a relatively quick 
shift  in  repressive  tactics  by  the  military  and  a  concomitant  contraction  in 
opportunities  for  organizing  challenges  to  the  military  outside  the  formal 
47Interview with activist, 09.05.2011
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political  arena.  This  contraction  of  space  for  opposition  actors  has  been 
chronicled by human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, who 
note  widespread  human  rights  violations  in  a  recent  report  that  it  is  worth 
quoting at length:
“On  the  negative  side  too,  the  SCAF  maintained  the  state  of  emergency 
continuously in  force since 1981 and in September  confirmed that  it  would 
enforce in full the draconian Emergency Law (Law 162 of 1958) and extend it 
to criminalize acts such as blocking roads, broadcasting rumours and “assault on 
freedom to work”. These changes directly threaten freedom of expression and 
association, and the rights to assembly and to strike – and even reverse reforms 
that the Mubarak government had felt obliged to make by public pressure in 
recent  years.  Other  tough  new  laws  were  introduced,  such  as  the  Law  on 
Thuggery (Law No. 10 of 2011) enacted in March to criminalize intimidation, 
“thuggery” and disturbing the peace, doubling sentences already prescribed in 
the Penal Code and providing for the death penalty. The SCAF further tightened 
restrictions  on  media  freedom,  warning  newspaper  editors  and  journalists 
against  publishing  anything  critical  of  the  armed  forces  without  prior 
consultation and permission. As well, human rights NGOs were threatened with 
prosecution  if  they  accepted  funding from abroad  without  prior  permission. 
Journalists,  bloggers and judges were investigated by military prosecutors or 
imprisoned by military courts for criticizing the army’s human rights violations 
during the uprising and the lack of reform. Some of the SCAF’s legal changes 
and policies targeting basic rights reinforced long-standing patterns of serious 
human rights violations, while others – such as subjecting women protesters to 
forced “virginity tests” – represented disturbing new forms of abuse. From the 
end of February onwards, the armed forces used violence to forcibly disperse 
protesters on several occasions. They used tear gas and rubber bullets and fired 
into the air with live ammunition and accused those they detained of looting or 
damaging public or private property or other crimes” (Amnesty International 
2012, p. 12-13)
Thus  while  the  increasingly  restrictive  environment  for  political  activity, 
reminiscent of the Mubarak era, was the permanent backdrop to the spiral of 
escalation  that  marked  the  Fall  months  of  2011  and  the  clashes  between 
protesters and the army, there were also more dynamic forces at work to be 
found  in  the  coalitional  shifts  among  former  ‘revolutionary  forces’ and  the 
army,  as  well  as  splits  within  the  revolutionary  coalition.  The  shift  in  the 
alliance pattern that arguably hurt the revolutionary coalition the most was the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s entering into what appeared to be a conservative alliance 
with the military rulers. Always of rather mixed revolutionary credentials, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, poised to be the major beneficiary of the revolutionary 
struggle (on the side of the former opposition forces that is, the military being 
the main beneficiary on the side of the former regime elite), decided it could 
reap most of these payoffs by focusing on normalizing the political process, a 
goal they shared with the SCAF. Thus, from very early in the transition period 
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the MB advocated abandoning the streets in favor of focusing on the creation of 
political  parties  and organizing the upcoming parliamentary elections,  which 
they wanted to see held at the earliest moment possible, similarly to the SCAF. 
They  were  supported  in  this  by  Salafist  groups,  which  though  traditionally 
apolitical had decided to engage with the political process on this momentous 
occasion.  While the MB, the only comprehensively organized political  force 
with any kind of grassroots basis, and endowed with generous financial assets, 
was  the  one  force  that  could profit  from early  elections,  many of  the  other 
political forces, revolutionary or not, were decidedly opposed to a tight election 
schedule.  The  new  political  party  law  issued  by  the  military  rulers,  while 
considerably  more  liberal  than  that  of  the  Mubarak  era,  still  imposed  high 
hurdles  on  registering  a  party,  amongst  them  the  requirement  for  5000 
signatures and publishing these signatures in a major daily newspaper. Many 
opposition activists felt that these restrictions were meant to privilege not only 
more established political forces, but also well-endowed forces catering mainly 
to  middle  and  upper  class  audiences.  The  post-revolutionary  era  was  thus 
characterized in terms of alliance politics by a move towards conservatism in 
which the military, as the only remaining elite actor (more on this in the section 
on elites as actors in the transition process), entered into what seemed like a 
pact with the only political force with promising electoral prospects and hence a 
potential future majority party in parliament in order to push for an agenda of 
early elections,  the suppression of  further  protests,  and the normalization of 
political life (Koehler 2012, 13). 
With the MB defecting to the side of the military, the revolutionary coalition 
was thus essentially  bereft  of  its  broad-based mobilization potential,  leaving 
only those whose entry into the political process was stunted by their lack of 
political  resources  –  be  that  in  terms  of  political  experience,  organizational 
skills, or financial assets - to take to the streets. Whereas the revolution had so 
far fallen short of satisfying many of their demands, the successful imposition 
of early elections without knowing the rules under which they would take place 
shifted the parameters of the political debate to extremely technocratic issues of 
electoral system choices, the benefits of one electoral system over another – 
technicalities that were ill-suited to produce wide-scale mobilization amongst 
people who had little to no knowledge of the subject matter. On the other hand 
the emerging alliance pattern shaped the debate in that it produced increasing 
polarization along the religion/secularism cleavage to the detriment of issues 
such as social justice, creating a cleavage pattern that the protesters had little 
opportunity to alter and which in terms of the discourses and framings of the 
debate eventually put them at a significant disadvantage (Koehler 2012, 12).
Protests in this transitional period therefore mirror the increasing political 
marginalization of youth groups,  which often lacked cohesive structures that 
could be transformed into organized political forces. While the revolution itself 
was a phase when the mobilization potential and stamina of these youth groups 
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drove developments, the period afterwards called for different sets of political 
skills, leading to the rise of more entrenched and traditional political actors like 
parties  and  long-time  politicians,  pushing  aside  the  youth  groups  in  the 
bargaining game with the SCAF over the future nature of the political system. 
The bargaining process essentially became elite-dominated, with little room for 
the less politically experienced youth activists. Yet here we also see differences 
between  activists.  While  those  with  long  histories  of  student  activism  or 
activism within different oppositional vehicles like Kifaya often joined political 
parties  (Ziad  El  Alimi,  Mustafa  al  Naggar),  and  could  thus  translate  their 
political significance during the revolution into political capital in its aftermath, 
many of the youth activists did not manage to take that step successfully, and 
were thus reduced to relying on the one instrument that had served them well in 
the past – demonstrations in Midan Tahrir. So not only did Egypt’s revolution 
fail to bring new strata into the political process (to a much lesser extent than 
the revolution in Tunisia for  example),  but  the political  game in some ways 
looked eerily similar to its pre-revolutionary version, with similar sets of actors 
competing with each other under slightly more open conditions and with a less 
certain endpoint to the process. 
Actors in the Transition
Elites
If one takes Perthes’ definition of politically relevant elites (PREs) as a starting 
point for delineating Egypt’s political elites, an approach that has been popular 
with students of Arab politics, one is faced with a certain dilemma as to how to 
distinguish between those elites in power, those influential and close to them, 
and  those  opposed  to  them that  nonetheless  enjoy  privileged  access  to  the 
media,  the  discursive structure of  the debate,  and greater  degrees  of  regime 
tolerance (which in countries such as Egypt before the revolution can be viewed 
as  one  invaluable  resource  amongst  others  for  opposition  actors).  Perthes 
defines the PRE as 
“those people in a given country who wield political influence and power in that 
they make strategic decisions or participate in decision making on a national 
level, contribute to defining political norms and values, and directly influence 
political discourse on strategic issues. The PRE thus encompasses the political 
elite,  defined  as  those  top  government,  administrative,  and  political  leaders 
‘who actually exercise power’ or ‘persons whose strategic position in large and 
powerful  organizations  and  movements  enable  them  to  influence  political 
decision  making  directly,  substantially,  and  regularly.’  The  PRE  reaches, 
however,  beyond  the  political  elite  to  include  groups  and  segments  that 
contribute  to  political  processes  or  influence  them  from  various  sidelines.” 
(Perthes 2004, 5)
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This  definition,  however,  opens  up a  Pandora’s  box with respect  to  how to 
differentiate between elite actors within the regime and elite actors opposed to 
them who are part of Egypt’s broader opposition and civil society landscape. 
Although drawing the line between genuine opposition elites and regime elites 
is  a  tricky  business  in  a  country  where  during  the  rule  of  Mubarak  ‘loyal’ 
opposition actors were tolerated to some extent, as long as they stayed within 
predefined limits and did not cross any red lines, for the purposes of this report 
it  is  still  a  worthwhile  endeavor.  In  discussing  elite  actors  during  our  two 
transitional  phases,  we  will  thus  restrict  ourselves  to  those  members  of  the 
political  elite  in  official  or  unofficial  positions  of  power  with  direct  (not 
indirectly  transmitted through media access)  influence to alter  and influence 
decision making. 
Traditionally speaking, Egypt’s elite was made up of those people close to 
the President himself; many of them in ‘official’ positions of power, but others 
not.  This so-called old guard was found in the higher echelons of the ruling 
NDP, as long time ministers or personal advisers to the president. The positions 
they held sometimes changed, but the people, most of whom had been with 
Mubarak since he started his Presidency, stayed the same. The most prominent 
among  them  included  the  former  NDP Secretary  General  Safwat  al-Sharif, 
former  Presidential  Chief  of  Staff  Zakaria  Azmi,  former  Minister  of 
Parliamentary Affairs Kamal Al Shazly, former Director of General Intelligence 
Omar Suleiman, former senior advisor to Mubarak and rumored grey eminence 
Osama al Baz, former Minister of Agriculture Youssuf Wali, former longtime 
Speaker of Parliament and later Minster of Parliamentary Affairs Fathi Sorour, 
as  well  as  former  Minister  of  Defense  Hussein  Tantawi.48 These  old  guard 
members  share  certain  characteristics  in  that  they  emerged  together  with 
Mubarak from various  public,  state-related  institutions,  such as  the  military, 
public bureaucracies and ministries. Thus, the ruling National Democratic Party, 
while not a center of power itself, served as a vehicle to provide positions for 
those people installed via their  connections with the president,  as well  as to 
control  a  potentially  unruly  organization  (which  was  also  one  of  the  main 
instruments of control in the parliament) on the other. Another organizational 
locus  of  power,  even  though  few  knew  exactly  how  powerful  until  the 
revolution,  was the military.  (Blades 2008, 2)  Hailed as one of  Egypt’s few 
institutions to command integrity as well as efficiency, the military’s influence 
ranged, according to commentators, from backbone of the regime in its function 
as last resort, to active political agent, influencing events and decisions behind 
the scenes. What is clear is not only do many high ranking figures come from a 
military background, including Mubarak himself, but the military establishment 
is also deeply interlinked with politics and the economy:
48Al Masry Al Youm, Gamal Mubarak and the discord in Egypt’s ruling Elite, 02.09.2010, 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/node/75005
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“Until  this  very day,  the  role  of  the  military establishment  in  the  economy 
remains one of the major taboos in Egyptian politics. Over the past thirty years, 
the army has insisted on concealing information about its enormous interests in 
the economy and thereby keeping them out of reach of public transparency and 
accountability. The Egyptian Armed Forces owns a massive segment of Egypt’s 
economy—twenty-five to forty percent, according to some estimates. In charge 
of  managing  these  enterprises  are  the  army’s  generals  and  colonels, 
notwithstanding  the  fact  that  they  lack  the  relevant  experience,  training,  or 
qualifications  for  this  task.  The  military’s  economic  interests  encompass  a 
diverse range of revenue-generating activities, including the selling and buying 
of real estate on behalf of the government, domestic cleaning services, running 
cafeterias, managing gas stations, farming livestock, producing food products, 
and manufacturing plastic table covers.”49
The military only answer to the president himself, and retired generals are to be 
found deeply entrenched in the political system, with 21 out of 29 appointed 
governors retired generals.50 Their interests were thus tightly linked with the 
state  in  an  economic  sense,  but  also  more  directly  to  the  survival  of  the 
Mubarak regime. (Blades 2008, 22)
These old guard and military figures were complemented, and as many 
believed replaced, by a so-called young guard, made up of the President’s son 
Gamal Mubarak and a cohort of foreign-educated business cronies that started 
filling up the NDP ranks from the early 2000s onwards. Gamal himself was an 
investment banker in London in the 1990s before his return to Egypt, where he 
quickly rose to prominence. In 2000 he was placed on the General Secretariat of 
the NDP, and in 2002 became head of its Policies Secretariat: 
“The NDP’s party conference in September 2002 further strengthened the hand 
of  the  younger  Mubarak’s  cohort.  Safwat  Sherif  replaced  Youssef  Wali  as 
secretary-general, and Gamal Mubarak became head of the NDP’s new Policies 
Secretariat. Significantly, the NDP’s General Secretariat grew to include more 
businessmen MPs (Hossam Awad and Hossam Badrawi). Elections by the six 
thousand delegates in attendance decisively shifted the General Secretariat to 
favor Gamal Mubarak’s platform” (Brownlee 2007, 147). 
His  platform  included  a  pronouncedly  reformist  orientation,  with  a  special 
emphasis on economic liberalization. That Gamal and his ‘young guard’ had 
gained  track  is  epitomized  in  the  ascension  of  the  2004  Ahmed  Nazif 
government, which included along with Gamal seven associated businessmen 
and drove an aggressive economic liberalization policy. Thus in the mid to late 
2000s, and in the wake of Gamal Mubarak’s rise to increasing political power, 
49Jadaliyya: The Army and the Economy in Egypt, 23.12.2011, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3732/the-
army-and-the-economy-in-egypt
50How Gamal brought the Whole Mubarak House Down, Al Ahram Weekly, 15.04.2011, 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/9988/Egypt/Politics-/How-Gamal-brought-the-whole-Mubarak-
house-down.aspx 
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Egypt witnessed a tight interlinking between economic and political power to a 
degree that had not been seen before. Positions of power afforded their owners 
access to economic resources, but economic actors as such always remained 
subordinated  to  the  political  logic  of  regime  maintenance.  During  Gamal 
Mubarak’s time, however, business elites began to penetrate the different strata 
of political power, epitomized in the corresponding rise (and fall) of Gamal’s 
friend and steel magnate Ahmed Ezz. 
The  rise  of  Gamal  Mubarak  as  well  as  his  perceived  grooming  for 
‘hereditary’ succession was not universally met with approval, however, and not 
only amongst opposition actors, but also within the elite itself. Specifically, both 
members of the old guard and the military establishment viewed the rise of both 
Gamal  and  his  coterie,  as  well  as  his  reformist  neoliberal  agenda,  with 
suspicion:
“Gamal’s  second push on the path to  power in  the ruling party's  ranks  was 
established in September 2002 when the NDP held its eighth general congress. 
Under  the  slogan  ‘A New  Style  of  Thinking,’ the  Policies  Secretariat  was 
created and headed by Gamal Mubarak. This was announced before a televised 
audience  and  around  6,000  of  the  party’s  political  bureaucrats.  The  new 
secretariat marked a significant shift in favour of Gamal and his associates from 
the  world  of  business,  particularly  since  it  produced  a  Higher  Council  for 
Policies  (HCP),  including  200  members,  mostly  young  businessmen  and 
academics allegedly tasked with relieving Egypt of the old socialist policies of 
the  1960s and antiquated  viewpoints  –  as  Gamal  once  called  them. Gamal's 
position as secretary for policies had become the party's second most powerful 
position,  only after  its  chairman:  Mubarak the father.  In  July 2004,  a  major 
reshuffling of the government reflected this new guard's control on the NDP and 
ministries  with  cabinet  positions  held  by  businessmen  and  liberal-oriented 
economists.  Ahmed  Nazif  headed  a  cabinet  that  was  notable  for  including 
Youssef  Boutros  Ghali  as  minister  of  finance,  Rashid  Mohamed  Rashid  for 
industry and trade, Ahmed Guweily in charge of investments and Ahmed El-
Maghraby  with  the  housing  portfolio.  Ghali,  Rashid  and  Mohieddin  were 
dubbed  “Gamal  Mubarak's  trio”  and  entrusted  with  drawing  up  the 
government's economic agenda.”51
While Gamal Mubarak’s rise represented a political threat for the old guard, 
whereby one part of the elite threatened to push aside or at least diminish the 
influence the other, for the military, whose vast economic holdings depended 
and still depend on the state, it was an economic as well as a political threat: 
51How Gamal brought the Whole Mubarak House Down, Al Ahram Weekly, 15.04.2011, 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/9988/Egypt/Politics-/How-Gamal-brought-the-whole-Mubarak-
house-down.aspx 
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“Contacts agree that presidential son Gamal Mubarak’s power base is centered 
in the business community, not with the military. XXXXXXXXXXXX52 said 
officers  told  him  recently  that  the  military  does  not  support  Gamal  and  if 
Mubarak died in office, the military would seize power rather than allow Gamal 
to succeed his father. However, analysts agreed that the military would allow 
Gamal  to  take  power  through  an  election  if  President  Mubarak  blessed  the 
process and effectively gave Gamal the reigns of power. XXXXXXXXXXXX 
opined  that  after  Gamal  became  active  in  the  NDP  in  2002,  the  regime 
empowered the reformers in the 2004 cabinet to begin privatization efforts that 
buttressed  the  wealthy  businessmen  close  to  Gamal.  In  his  estimation,  the 
regime’s goal is to create a business-centered power base for Gamal in the NDP 
to compensate for his lack of military credentials. A necessary corollary to this 
strategy, he claimed, was for the regime to weaken the military’s economic and 
political power so that it cannot block Gamal’s path to the presidency.”53
Thus,  on  the  eve  of  the  revolution,  the  country  was  living  with  an  aging 
President whose health was widely believed to be deteriorating but who had 
nonetheless  announced his  intention  to  run for  a  sixth  time for  President,  a 
potential  successor  who  was  widely  unpopular  with  the  opposition,  whose 
business cronies were seen as responsible for economic reforms that had left 
many Egyptians increasingly impoverished, and who was viewed with suspicion 
at best by the other segments of the elites. The revolution itself unfolded in the 
shadow  of  these  dynamics  of  elite  change.  The  prospect  of  hereditary 
succession was one of the core concerns voiced by opposition figures over the 
years,  and  Gamal’s  political  platform had  led  to  a  worsening  in  the  lot  of 
workers  who  suffered  under  corrupt  privatization  practices,  as  well  as  the 
general living conditions of ordinary people, all of which contributed to bring 
them onto the streets.
These elite changes and conflicts also played into the unfolding of the 
revolution itself. While Mubarak and much of his old guard initially failed to 
comprehend the extent of the events and the severity of the threat they posed to 
the regime and its survival,  Gamal Mubarak and his cronies were – at  least 
according to mainstream accounts – more active in trying to save the regime, 
albeit  using  tactics  of  regime  repression  that  not  only  failed  to  halt  the 
mobilization but actually served to foment public anger when they (allegedly) 
orchestrated the battle of the camel. While the old and young guards thus tried 
to  stave  off  the  protests  by  all  means  possible,  the  army  played  a  more 
ambiguous role. Whereas the former stood to lose unambiguously should the 
regime fall, the latter, due to its high prestige in society, as well as its rather less 
than ironclad hold on its lower and middle ranks, faced a more complex payoff. 
On the one hand, the army, or at least its higher echelons, are not only linked to 
but a deeply entrenched part of the regime itself. Due to their political stature, as 
52The identity of XXXXXX is not disclosed in the cable.
53Cable #2091, from the embassy in Cairo to Washington, 
 23.09.2008http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/09/08CAIRO2091.html#
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well  as  their  economic  interests,  they could thus  have  very  little  interest  in 
seeing the regime fall. On the other hand, the doubts the Tunisian revolution had 
sown about the impossibility of bringing down the regime, combined with the 
reluctance to get their hands dirty alongside loathed rivals for resources from 
the other security branches as well as their tenuous hold over the lower army 
ranks, led the military leaders to at least keep their position open, not siding 
clearly either with the protesters or the security services.54 In the short run this 
benefited the protesters, who felt encouraged by the reluctance of the army to 
intervene and sought to interpret this as army support for their cause. However, 
a more appropriate assumption seems to be that the army tried to avoid taking a 
stance for as long as they could, and only decided to force Mubarak out when it 
became clear that at least the face of the regime, as well as its leading figures, 
had to go. 
If we take a closer look at elite developments after the revolution during 
the transitional phase, we see that while before the events a more diverse elite 
picture with various competing elite segments vying for either more influence 
or seeking to protect the influence they already held, with Mubarak at the center 
arbitrating the different factions was in place, after a picture where only one of 
these elite segments remains now applies, and members of the other two elites, 
that is the old guard and Gamal and his cronies, have been put on trial.55 Thus, 
whether the SCAF put members of former rival elite segments on trial due to an 
urge to satisfy  popular  demands or,  conversely,  in  order  to settle  old scores 
remains open to speculation. It is clear, however, that in the short and in the 
long run, as the only elite segment remaining, the army has taken steps to secure 
its  interests,  both  economic  and  political,  against  future  rulers,  should  they 
actually hand over power as planned in June 2012. Thus, as Perthes remarks: 
“Elites are never, even in revolutionary situations, totally exchanged. In most 
Arab states, incumbent elites significantly influence the formation of the new 
elite that will replace them.” (Perthes 2004, 10)
Civil Society Actors
Regarding the civil society actors involved in Egypt’s transition process, we will 
continue to follow the strategy of breaking down the narratives about the roles 
of the different actors into two phases, during regime breakdown on one hand 
and in the transition phase proper on the other. For most actors involved, this 
will mean referring to the pre-revolutionary period in order to illustrate their 
origins, organizational capabilities and mindsets. The discussion of actors will 
therefore  be  somewhat  internally  inconsistent  in  that  some  actors  constitute 
actual organizational entities,  some are more loosely formed movements and 
54Interview with activist, Cairo, 09.05.2011
55Al Ahram Online, The Battle of the Camel trial reunites cornerstone figures of Egypt’s former regime, 
12.09.2011, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/20967/Egypt/Politics-/The-Battle-of-Camel-trial-
reunites-cornerstone-fig.aspx
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groups, and others are part of a diffuse collective belonging to a certain ‘social 
class’ without clearly defined boundaries, and who did not actually step onto the 
revolutionary  scene  as  actors  proper  before  the  mobilization  that  led  to  the 
downfall of Mubarak. The rationale for including the latter in this part on actors 
in the transition is that while they may not constitute organized groups which 
can be analyzed using the same somewhat restrictive categories, their presence 
on the streets in significant numbers during the breakdown of Husni Mubarak’s 
regime as during parts of the transition period that followed is what ‘made’ the 
revolution in the first place. Thus, even if they do not boast the same degrees of 
coherence and organizational capacity as civil society groups proper, leaving 
them out of the discussion would not only restrict the view on the revolution to 
a  very elitist  perspective,  it  would also give a very truncated picture  of  the 
complex interactions  between different  groups  and their  strategies,  and how 
these differences accounted for the trajectories of the transition phase.
Pro-Democracy Movements
With regards to the pre-revolutionary period, the groups involved in organizing 
at this point were, as already mentioned, the 6 April movement, the Coalition to 
Support  El-Baradei,  the  youth  wing  of  the  Democratic  Front  party,  and the 
Justice  and  Freedom  movement.  These  youth  movements,  far  from  being 
spontaneous ad hoc creations, had actually acquired an extended organizational 
history rooted in the civil society mobilizations of the beginning of the 2000s by 
the time of the revolutionary upheaval.  These first  demonstrations led to the 
formation of the  Egyptian Popular Committee in Solidarity with the Intifada 
(EPCSI),  which centered on the plight of the Palestinians at the start of the 
second Palestinian Intifada. The EPCSI was a movement that initially focused 
on providing help to Palestinians through donations of blood and funds,56 but 
later turned into a source of activism in Egypt well beyond its initial purpose. 
Many of the activists that became recurrent figures on Egypt’s opposition scene 
and moved on to participate in various other protest organizations were drawn 
from amongst its members. On the one hand, the EPCSI involved re-mobilized 
figures who had been active during the student protests in the 1970s, but on the 
other  also  served  as  the  site  of  politicization  for  many  new  activists  from 
Egypt’s universities and beyond.57 Demonstrations continued throughout 2001 
and 2002, which then seamlessly ushered in protests against the US led war on 
Iraq in 2003. It was then that activists involved in both protests in support of the 
Intifada  and against  the  war  on Iraq merged to  form the  20 March Popular 
Campaign for Change, another key organization on Egypt’s activist scene, and 
the first to transcend the line between demands exclusively focused on foreign 
policy issues, and demands linking international conditions to domestic politics 
56Al Ahram Weekly, No. 748, A Chronology of Dissent, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/748/eg10.htm
57Interview with long-term activist at the Socialist Studies Center and the Revolutionary Socialists, September 
25 2005, Cairo.
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and ultimately the nature of the Egyptian regime: 
“The  main  difference  between  the  pro-Intifada  mobilization  and  the  2003 
mobilization  was  the  level  of  radicalism.  The  pro-Intifada  protests  were 
something like a charity. The regime could easily say that it was in favour of the 
Palestinians  as  well.  Even  some  activists  were  surprised  when  there  were 
clashes with the police because they did not perceive their mobilization to be 
directed against the regime at all. 2003, by contrast, was a clear attack against 
the regime. The focus started to turn on Mubarak, people were tearing down his 
pictures and shouted slogans denouncing him. In general there was the feeling 
that Mubarak was the appropriate target of mobilization”.58 
The  second  organizational  milestone  on  the  road  to  the  formation  of  the 
aforementioned youth movements was the Egyptian Movement for Change, or 
Kifaya, which started to mobilize against the president and his son in 2004, just 
before  the  important  election  year  of  2005  which  saw both  the  presidential 
referendum  (later  transformed  into  the  first  multi-candidate  presidential 
elections  by  the  regime)  and  parliamentary  elections.  With  the  opposition’s 
failure to significantly impact the elections ushering in a period of protracted 
crisis within the movement, as well as amongst opposition parties, Kifaya all 
but ceased to play a role in shaping the oppositional arena except as a vehicle 
for  opposition  figures  to  voice  demands  in  the  press,  and  occasionally  at 
conferences. Thus, after 2006, activists previously involved in Kifaya started to 
move away, with many younger activists involved in its youth wing, Youth for 
Change,  moving  on  to  other,  more  grassroots-oriented  projects  such  as 
Tadammon, and later the at first largely internet-based 6 April movement.59 As 
one activist put it, it was not that people actively quit Kifaya, because there was 
nothing  to  quit,  it  was  simply  necessary  for  the  time  being,  but  after  the 
parliamentary and presidential elections it had simply served its purpose.60
Thus, the different youth groups were a more or less direct outcome of the 
organizational  changes  in  the  opposition  landscape,  starting  with  the 
demonstrations in solidarity with the Palestinians in 2000. 
While within these groups people belonged to different political currents, 
some liberal, some leftist, some from the far left, there remained considerable 
similarities  consistent  with  the  organizational  characteristics  of  the  previous 
organizations. What united them was the fact that a) they were all  relatively 
young people, mostly in their 20s and 30s, that they were b) activists, many of 
whom had been involved in opposition politics, human rights work etc. for quite 
some time, and that they c) came from a similar middle class background. These 
activists had not only participated in demonstrations for years, they had actively 
58Interview with activist, Cairo, 07.05.2011
59Dina Shehata, talk at a joint panel discussion on: “From Revolution to Transformation: Egypt 2011/ Germany 
1989” by the American University in Cairo and the Freie Universität Berlin, 08.05.2011
60Interview with activist, Cairo, 28.04.2011
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partaken in organizing them, thus refuting the claim that the revolution was a 
spontaneous uprising inspired by the events in Tunisia. To be sure, Tunisia had 
an impact, but for the most part only with regard to their hopes of getting bigger 
numbers  onto  the  streets  than their  demonstrations  would  normally  attract.61 
What is even more important than the fact that these were not essentially new 
actors on Egypt’s opposition scene was that these were actors that were well 
connected  amongst  each  other,  that  had  cooperated  previously,  that  had 
members  who  had  often  attended  the  same  universities,  and  had  collected 
experience in organizing opposition activism within and outside the confines of 
the university  campuses.62 Thus,  when talking about  initial  mobilizers,  those 
who put out the calls for action, we are talking about young, educated, well 
connected and mostly middle class activists. These facts also help to shed some 
light on the other factor in this pre-revolutionary period that has received much 
media attention: the role of social networking sites such as Facebook and twitter 
in  getting the calls  for  protest  out  and publicized,  as  well  as  in attracting a 
significant following on the streets on January 25 itself. What we thus have to 
keep in mind is the fact that these tools, while crucial for initial mobilization in 
terms of their potential to disseminate information to a broad audience avoiding 
the  tightly  controlled  regular  channels  of  communication,  are  tools  that  are 
common/widespread only among certain parts of the population. What is more, 
they were tools that had been used for similar purposes from at least 2005/6 
onwards, yet as one analyst remarks with vastly differing results in terms of 
turnout.63 Thus, while Facebook & Co were important, their role is not sufficient 
to explain the extent of the mobilization witnessed during the revolution. And 
while it is certainly true that they improved their strategies and tactics in terms 
of secrecy and surprise elements,  these were essentially still  tried and tested 
strategies for opposition movements.
While these actors still represented a fairly coherent picture during the 
run up to  the revolution  as  well  as  during the  revolution itself,  this  was  to 
change  during  the  transition  phase.  Some  of  the  more  experienced  actors 
involved  in  networks  with  political  opposition  parties  in  addition  to  their 
university  networks  moved  on  to  join  several  political  parties  in  a  bid  for 
parliamentary  representation.  Thus,  these  actors  were  considerably  more 
reluctant to join the continued calls for protests organized by groups such as 6 
April alongside several revolutionary youth coalitions formed during or after the 
revolution.  This  development  drove  post-revolutionary  processes  in  decisive 
ways in that on one side the revolution and the post-revolutionary opening of 
the electoral process to former opposition actors allowed a new generation of 
young activists and politicians to get a foot in the door of the political process – 
which would of course have been denied to them under the old regime. Thus, 
61Interview with activist 28.04.11
62Particularly important in this regard were the activist networks from Cairo University
63Rabab Al-Mahdi, talk at a joint panel discussion on: “From Revolution to Transformation: Egypt 2011/ 
Germany 1989” by the American University in Cairo and the Freie Universität Berlin, 08.05.2011
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this  development  funneled  new  and  fresh  blood  into  the  political  process, 
affording  Egypt’s  young  political  talent  a  stake  in  the  emerging  new  (and 
potentially democratic) regime. On the other side, this funneling off of the most 
talented,  ambitious  and  experienced  opposition  activists  also  meant  that  the 
youth movements were essentially bereft of leaders with previous experience in 
organizing political activities. Hence, while the networks established between 
youth activists before and during the revolution remained mostly intact, serving 
as the basis for further mobilization, at the same time, their most experienced 
members, and thus those with the most political capital to succeed under the 
new conditions,  left  to  join  more  organized political  forces  that  were  better 
positioned to profit from the new political arrangements. Particularly prominent 
amongst  those political  parties that  attracted young activists were the Social 
Democrats, and Hizb Al-Adl, the former being joined by Ziad Al-Alimi, one of 
the original organizers of the January 25 protests, and the latter by Mustafa Al 
Naggar. Thus, this brain drain left the revolutionary youth groups somewhat ill 
positioned to further their own claims in ways that were likely to lead to success 
when it started to become clear that not only was the military using increasingly 
violent methods against them, but also that the general populace was far from 
being supportive of their taking to Cairo’s streets in continued protests.
Religious movements - The Muslim Brotherhood
The role  of  Islamists,  and particularly members  of  the  Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB), is fairly ambivalent looking at the overall period. This ambivalence was 
already apparent during the first phase, the overthrow of Husni Mubarak, even 
though nobody, not even the most staunch leftists,  would deny the role they 
played in  the  revolution.  The  MB,  as  one  of  Egypt’s  oldest  yet  technically 
illegal opposition groups, while allowing their youth wing to attend the protests, 
had originally decided to stay formally out of them, afraid that this would either 
lead to  the protests  being portrayed as an Islamist  attempt  to overthrow the 
regime or, if not successful, provoke a violent backlash against the group, which 
is  one  of  the  most  regular  targets  of  regime repression.  One  leading  figure 
described the calculation behind this decision in the following way: 
“We provided material and support to the Revolution, but we realized that the 
regime depended on the presence of the MB to scare people. The Minister of the 
Interior said on 25 January that the protests were instigated by the MB. Also the 
President was saying on 1 February that there was only him or the MB. We 
anticipated this reaction.”64 
Thus, while hesitant to directly endorse the revolution under its own name at the 
very beginning,  at  the same time the MB did nothing to prevent youth and 
64Interview with MB member, Cairo, 22.05.11
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individual members from attending either. That their fear of repression was not 
entirely unfounded is clearly borne out by the fact that several of their leaders 
were arrested in the run up to 28 January in a bid by the regime to prevent the 
protests  from garnering  widespread  support.  After  the  initial  success  of  the 
January 25 protests, and after debates within the group, they finally decided to 
throw their  weight  behind the revolution  on January  27 and called  on their 
members  to  join after  the next  day’s Friday prayers.65 Apart  from the sheer 
numbers of supporters they brought to the protests, what many activists credit 
them for is  the efficiency with which they organized the defense around the 
embattled protesters in Tahrir,  preventing them from being “crushed” by the 
regime and its plain clothes thugs.66 That they were able to play such a role was 
largely due to their nature as one of Egypt’s only organized opposition forces, 
with a solid grassroots base, strict organizational  discipline, and independent 
finances. It was this superior degree of organization and discipline that allowed 
them to uphold the defense line at Midan Tahrir with an efficiency lacking is all 
the other groups present during the protests. 
However,  the  protests  in  general  as  well  as  the  involvement  of  MB 
members uncovered a fault line amongst activists. This crack had been growing 
in recent years, and eventually resulted in a split within the organization itself. 
In past years there had been an increasing sense of frustration among younger 
activists with an older generation of opposition politicians that were perceived 
as not only patronizing in their approach of dealing with youth, but also as too 
complacent towards a regime which had afforded them limited but nevertheless 
some political space – which exceeded that afforded to the opposition in other 
Arab countries such as Tunisia or Syria. Thus there are legitimate doubts as to 
whether the MB leadership, had it decided to issue an actual ban on protesting 
on 25 January, would have succeeded in controlling members of their younger 
generations in particular.
That  this  generational  cleavage  should  be  taken  seriously  was  made 
surprisingly visible in the second, transitional phase following the downfall of 
Mubarak, and the concomitant split between parts of the MB’s young guard and 
its leadership. In one of their greatest successes in decades, shortly after the 
downfall of Mubarak the military licensed the MB-affiliated (albeit nominally 
independent)  Freedom  and  Justice  Party.  The  MB  leadership’s  attempts  at 
imposing party discipline, whereby MB members were only allowed to join the 
Freedom and  Justice  party  and  were  banned  from either  forming  their  own 
parties or joining others, led to open conflict between young MB members, and 
particularly those closely involved with organizing the protests,  and the MB 
leadership. These young members instead founded the Egypt Current Party and 
joined a coalition with the Revolution Continues Alliance, which however did 
65Interview with MB member, Cairo, 22.05.2011
66Interview with activist, Cairo, 03.05.2011
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rather  poorly  in  the  parliamentary  elections.67 What  is  interesting  about  the 
young members of the MB going there own way is the fact that this move fits 
into an overall pattern of de-ideologized network building, especially amongst 
younger activists, and that is also visible in organizations such as 6 April, which 
defines itself via common overall  goals  (more democracy) and the adequate 
means  to  reach  them  (street  protests),  but  differs  in  terms  of  the  concrete 
ideological orientations of members. Thus, activists from this young generation 
themselves remarked how they differed from the so-called 70s generation of 
former student activists that now dominates the political scene, in that there are 
no  deeply  entrenched  battles  and  enmities  among  leftists  and  Islamists,  a 
characteristic  which  afforded  them  the  opportunity  to  form  networks  of 
university  activists  across  the  political  spectrum and  focus  on  the  common 
enemy – the former regime under Husni Mubarak.68 While this was certainly a 
welcome departure and one that broadened their opportunities for cooperation in 
the perspective of young activists, it remains something that older generations, 
especially in the MB, regard with suspicion. 
The older  MB leadership played a  decidedly  conservative  role  in  this 
second phase in that in collaborating with the military rulers they endorsed not 
only the return to normalcy and the demand to abstain from further protests, but 
also the SCAF’s envisioned electoral system, the timetable for parliamentary 
elections, and the order in which the constitution and parliamentary elections 
should be dealt with. There are two main reasons behind this. On the one hand, 
the MB is the force positioned to benefit most clearly from elections being held 
as early as possible, and from the constitution being written by a parliament 
likely to be dominated by the MB itself. It is the only organization with any 
grassroots base to speak of that can mobilize substantial amounts of people, that 
is  widely known in the populace (this is  a problem that  plagues liberal  and 
leftist forces especially, perhaps with the exception of the Wafd and Tagammu), 
and  that  commands  a  coherent,  disciplined,  experienced  and  efficient 
organizational apparatus. However, for this to take effect and the MB to truly 
benefit  from its unique position in this transitional  phase,  the support of the 
military in terms of licensing and tolerating their party was needed. This in turn 
depended on the amount of threat the SCAF believed the MB to pose – hence 
the discouragement of protests as destabilizing as well as the endorsement of the 
various  SCAF proposals.  That  this  was  a  risky  game to  play  became clear, 
however, when the SCAF, taken aback by the scale of the victory of the MB at 
the polls, announced that they did not view the upcoming parliament as fully 
representative  and  reserved  the  option  to  change  the  balance  of  power  by 
appointing additional members, thus breaking their implicit or explicit pact with 
the MB:
67Egyptian Current Party, Jadaliyya, 18.11.2011, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3156/egyptian-current-
party 
68Interview with activist, Cairo, 24.05.2011
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“In  a  rare  briefing  with  foreign  journalists  on  Wednesday,  army  General 
Mukhtar  al-Mulla  said  that  parliament's  ability  to  choose  a  100-member 
assembly that will draft the new constitution will be constrained by military-
approved "parameters",  according to media reports.  Just  a day after the first 
round of parliamentary voting finished, delivering Islamists roughly two-thirds 
of the available seats, Mulla, a member of the ruling Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF), said the country's new parliament could not be broadly 
representative  of  Egypt because elections  are  occurring  ‘in  such  unstable 
conditions’. ‘What we are seeing is free and fair elections ... but they certainly 
don't represent all sectors of society,’ Mulla said, according to the Guardian. He 
said that the military would appoint an advisory civilian council to act as an 
intermediary between the SCAF, parliament and the cabinet - which itself was 
appointed  by  the  military.  All  four  groups  would  have  to  agree  on  the 
composition of the 100-member constitutional assembly, Mulla said. ‘There will 
be an agreement beforehand on the form of this constituent assembly between 
the cabinet, the advisory committee for the military council, and the parliament,’ 
he told reporters.”69
Thus, while the old leadership of the MB represents an essentially conservative 
force with respect not only to its ideological stance but also to its positions on 
change, the viability of street action, and the role of new or younger generations 
in the political  system, their  young generation,  with their  tightly interwoven 
networks  with  fellow  university  students  belonging  to  different  ideological 
orientations,  is  more  firmly  rooted  on the  side  of  the  young protesters  who 
refuse  to  be  complacent  about  the  pace  and  direction  of  change  during the 
transitional phase. 
Workers’ Movement
The  question  of  working  class  impact  in  recent  Egyptian  events  has  so  far 
remained contested. Disagreement concerns how much influence the workers’ 
calls for general strikes had on the outcome of the revolution, their presence on 
Tahrir before the call for a general strike, as well as their influence on strategies 
and tactics. What is clear by all accounts is that the general strike was the first 
time in the revolution that the workers, as a more or less organized force, came 
into play and thereby significantly shifted the balance of accounts in favor of 
the  protesters,  helping  to  at  least  speed  up  the  process  of  bringing  down 
Mubarak. What is less clear is the role of the workers before they issued this 
general call. While some argue that they were not present at all, some say they 
were there all along, only as individuals rather than as ‘workers’. This becomes 
clearer  if  we take into account  the fact  that  workers had only very recently 
started  to  establish  their  own  unions  independently  of  the  state-controlled 
corporatist union federation the EFTU, which served more as an instrument to 
impose control from above rather than a representation of workers from below. 
69Egypt’s army asserts constitutional control, Al Jazeera, 09.12.2011, 
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Moreover, during the revolution employers also went on strike, leaving factories 
closed:  “During  the  first  weeks,  the  factories  were  closed,  so  the  workers 
decided individually to go or not to go. There were no independent unions, of 
course,  so  there  was  also  no  collective  decision  making.”70 Thus,  whether 
workers showed up on Tahrir or not depended on their own political attitudes as 
citizens, and not, at least in the early days, on any collective union decision. 
“When they were called back to work, however, they went on strike. That was 
in the last three days. And they went on strike for openly political reasons”71. 
Thus  the  workers’  involvement,  like  that  of  other  social  strata,  cannot 
exclusively be judged according to whether they were involved in and organized 
way. Instead, many of the workers that had become politicized starting from 
more economically-oriented demands forwarded in the workers’ strikes from 
2006 onwards, attended the demonstrations from the very beginning.72 What is 
crucial in this respect is the fact that 
“since 2006, more than 1.8 million of people were involved in strikes and that’s 
not  including  their  families  and  friends  who  thereby  heard  about  it.  The 
breaking of fear like that cannot be called insignificant, if you have 1.8 million 
who have somehow contended with authority in some way”.73 
Thus, it was the experience of contesting authority over an extended period of 
time that contributed not only to workers being ready to mobilize, but also to 
their inventing their own particular ways and strategies of dealing with a regime 
reluctant to give in to their demands, with the physical occupation of space via 
sit-ins for example:
“If you look at the tactics adopted during 18 days,  the labor movement was 
important. For example occupations and sit-ins in the streets are labor tactics, 
especially the not leaving space part [i.e. the occupation of significant spaces 
like factories, squares]. The taking over of significant places like the main TV 
station are tactics that came from the tax collectors in 2007 with their sit-in in 
front of the parliament”.74
With  the  political  struggle  in  the  second,  transitional  phase  increasingly 
focusing  on  laying  down  electoral  rules  and  the  struggle  over  whether  a 
parliament should be established before a constitution written (the MB’s and the 
SCAF’s  position)  or  vice  versa  (the  position  of  many  leftists  and  liberal 
movements and parties),  workers,  in terms of  their  struggle as  well  as  their 
grievances, fell by the wayside. For many political actors, the transitional phase 
70Interview with activist, Cairo, 09.05.2011
71Interview with activist, Cairo, 09.05.2011
72Interview with activist, Cairo, 09.05.201173Rabab Al-Mahdi, talk at a joint panel discussion on: “From Revolution to Transformation: Egypt 2011/ 
Germany 1989” by the American University in Cairo and the Freie Universität Berlin, 08.05.2011
74Interview with activist, Cairo, 24.05.2011
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was one in which genuinely political questions needed to be dealt with, rather 
than  getting  hung  up  on  ‘particularistic’ economic  questions.75 Hence,  the 
political  discourse  of  the  day  increasingly  marginalized  workers’ rights  and 
interests, and perpetrators even included some progressive forces (an exception 
here  are  the  activists  and politicians  associated  with  very  leftist  parties  and 
coalitions like the Egyptian Socialist Party, which did not however occupy an 
equal space in the mainstream discourse compared to other parties, and either 
did not formally register  as a political party at  all  or did very poorly in the 
elections). 
However, this did not mean that the workers as an organized force played 
no role  in  this  second phase.  Instead,  after  the brief  phase  of  the  fusing of 
opposition energies during the breakdown of the regime, the workers’ economic 
struggle  took  its  separate  path,  as  it  had  before  the  revolution,  often  pitted 
against significant obstacles in the SCAF. Thus, the year after the revolution 
saw numerous strikes throughout the year, and a veritable strike wave starting 
from  September  17.  It  also  saw  the  founding  of  an  independent  union 
federation, the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU), on 
30 January 2011. Before the revolution, in addition to Egypt’s state controlled, 
corporatist Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), workers had fought for 
and succeeded in securing the establishment of three independent unions, but 
only after a massive strike wave that shook Egypt’s economy in the latter part of 
the  2000s.  In  contrast,  2011  saw  the  formation  of  over  300  new  unions 
organized  under  the  banner  of  the  EFITU,  yet  these  were  not  officially 
permitted by the military rulers, who had already passed a law outlawing and 
heavily  penalizing  strikes  and  protests  in  March  2011.76 Thus,  while  the 
networks  of  the  workers’ movement  persisted  into  the  second  phase  of  the 
transition, many of the features that had characterized their earlier activism – 
the separation of their protest from ‘genuine’ political protest, both in terms of 
protest events and the discourses of the political protesters, the lack of positive 
feedback between economic and political protests (which ironically would have 
transformed the revolution from a theoretical gimmick into an actual social and 
political one), their complete absence as a force on the political scene (indeed, 
one of the most promising new parties,  the Social Democratic Party, did not 
include the workers’ movement either programmatically or personally, unlike its 
European counterparts), and hence potential to have an impact on the future of 
the political system. 
Lower Class Participants
The question of strategies that sprang from the specific way in which social 
75Time Magazine, Has the Revolution Left Egypt’s Workers Behind?, 23.06.2011, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2079605,00.html
76Joel Beinin, What have workers gained from Egypt’s revolution? 20.07.2011, 
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/07/20/what_have_workers_gained_from_egypt_s_revolution
42
strata interacted with authority played a big part in the events analyzed here in 
terms of the strategies that proved crucial in holding on to physical space, and 
thus  how protests  were shaped not  only by middle  class  youth using social 
media, but also by lower class participants that actively shaped the repertoire 
available to protesters. It was these people from in and around Cairo that made 
the  ultimate  difference  in  terms  of  the  extent  of  mobilization  compared  to 
protests that had been staged in previous years: 
“While groups of professional youth revolutionaries led the organization, what 
made  it  successful  was  that  millions  joined.  If  it  had  not  been  for  the 
marginalized, the third class of Cairo and its surrounding areas on the 28th things 
would not have moved. What united these people was that all of them hated 
Mubarak,  but none of them was mobilized because of electoral  politics,  but 
rather because there are no jobs, they have no food”.77
It was these people that made the occupation of Tahrir successful, not just in 
terms of numbers, although they arguably accounted for a huge chunk of the 
demonstrators, but in terms of complementing the tried and tested (and usual 
failed) tactics that middle class activists brought to the table. As one of these 
activists recalls, 
“on the 25th it was mainly middle class people mobilized through the internet. 
But  on  the  28th it  was  different.  And  people  from  the  lower  classes  were 
essential for fighting against the police. I for example never even thought about 
attacking  soldiers  or  police.  Activists  would  just  run  away  and  collect 
themselves somewhere else and try the same again. The people who came with 
the  idea of  attacking back were  not  activists.  The experience people had in 
encountering police in their daily lives is very different. [...] Political activists 
were not on those fronts defending Tahrir simply because they lack the skills. 
People from the middle class are not normally in contact with the police in their 
daily lives, and political activists encounter them but in a different way than 
lower class people”.78
When considering those that mobilized in protests against the regime for the 
first time in their lives during the revolution it is important to note that Egypt is 
a country with sharply divided spheres of interaction between regime, political 
actors,  and  different  social  classes.  The  political  sphere  in  particular  is 
completely detached from the everyday lives of the majority, either because it is 
seen as something far away from everyday life, where a language that ordinary 
people  do  not  understand  is  spoken,  that  is  discourses  that  are  simply  not 
meaningful to people because they cannot relate them to their everyday lives. 
Thus  key  terms  like  democracy  either  do  not  resonate  at  all  or  resonate 
differently from their intended perception, very simply in terms of the language 
77Interview with activist, Cairo, 07.05.2011
78Interview with activist, Cairo, 03.05.2011
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itself.  Thus,  while  almost  every  home  has  access  to  satellite  television 
nowadays,  this  does  not  necessarily  foster  an  understanding of  politics  or  a 
sense  of  belonging.  News,  be  it  in  written  or  in  televised  form,  is  usually 
conveyed in some form of classical Arabic, whereas the majority of Egyptians 
speak the local dialect. In a society that knows no grassroots organization in 
political terms, where the different social strata are profoundly separated, and 
this  separation  has  always  been  actively  promoted  by  the  regime,  there  is 
complete alienation of the lower classes from the political sphere that is not 
understood, has no apparent relation with their daily struggles, and where they 
simply do not belong. Thus, one activist recalls handing out flyers to promote 
their newly formed party after the revolution, and one man, while interested, 
thought he would not be able to join because he was wearing the uniform of a 
street cleaner. Thus politics for most people is a domain reserved for elites, not 
the common people.79
In this  respect,  not  much has changed for  the majority  of  participants 
from lower classes. The institutionalization of the post-revolutionary process, as 
well as the focus on the technicalities of organizing the future political system, 
has  left  them  outside  the  process,  as  marginalized  politically  as  they  were 
before.  Hence,  when  the  clashes  between  the  military  and  protesters  turned 
violent, street children and marginalized young urban men in particular were to 
be found at the front lines of the battle, searching for and at least temporarily 
finding a renewed sense of meaning. What this reflects is the fact that especially 
for these young and socially marginalized men the revolution meant more than 
just  toppling Hosni  Mubarak,  it  meant  regaining agency and in that  process 
dignity. For them, taking part in the protests was to be part of a society that had 
so far neglected them: 
“Lawyer Tarek El Awady is representing 82 children arrested for taking part in 
last  month's  violent  demonstrations  outside  the  Cabinet  and  parliament 
buildings. He says these street children sought shelter, food and companionship 
from protesters encamped downtown. Abdelhamid says the children tell her and 
other protesters that they are the only Egyptians who make them feel they are 
important. […] Their advocates say most, if not all, of these kids live on Cairo's 
streets, and that they see the revolution as a way to escape their isolation from 
society.”80
 “The Square, the ‘safe’ zone, contained a truly socially mixed crowd. […] On 
the front line, by contrast (and naturally so given the nature of the battle), the 
demographic  was  predominantly  (though  not  exclusively)  young,  male,  and 
socially  marginal.  […]But  the  majority  of  frontline  fighters  came  from the 
substantial population of young, socially marginal men from Cairo’s peripheral 
‘ashwa’i  (informal) neighborhoods. They are sometimes called the  wilad sis. 
79Interview with activist, Cairo, 03.05.2011
80Egypt’s street kids are revolution’s smallest soldiers, NPR, 04.01.2012, 
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[…] They were not fighting for any high-minded outcome such as democracy; 
in fact, most possibly they do not think anything ‘good’ will come out of this 
fight. But the fight gives them back their dignity, even if temporarily.  Karama 
for them means their bodies not being subject to torture and mistreatment at 
checkpoints and police stations. […] But the frontline and the Square are also 
part of one whole. The frontline’s raison d’être is (partly, originally) to protect 
the Square, even if it also developed into a fight for its own sake. Without the 
on-the-ground crowd of ultras and the wilad sis prepared to stop police violence 
with their own bodies, and most importantly, to hit back, the largely middle-
class opposition could not have held the Square for long. The strength of Tahrir 
Square,  physical,  political,  and  intellectual  (tens  of  thousands  of  people, 
substantially of middle class demographics, including the occasional celebrity, 
making politically articulated demands) made the fight on the frontline possible 
and somehow ‘legitimate.’ Without the protection of the greater cause of the 
Square, the brutal force of the army would have crushed the not-so-photogenic 
fighters a long time ago, with nobody paying any attention. They would have 
been swept away and forgotten as vandals and thugs.”81
Thus, while many lower class participants faded back into their everyday lives, 
some of the marginal young defenders of Tahrir, as well as those families of 
‘martyrs’ that died during the revolution remained, with few options other than 
protests at their disposal to try to redress their grievances. 
Middle Class Participants
The detachment of the political sphere from most people in society does not 
affect  the  lower  classes  only.  It  also  engulfs  the  middle  classes,  albeit  for 
entirely different reasons. The majority of Egypt’s lower classes shun politics 
because it simply has no perceived relevance for their daily lives, but they do 
encounter authority and hence repression in those daily lives. The interaction of 
the majority of Egypt’s middle class (excluding political activists and opposition 
politicians, which although composed almost exclusively of middle class people 
represents a minority within this class) with the political sphere, however, was 
of a radically different nature. They were just as alienated from the regime as 
the lower classes, and the political sphere had just as little to offer by way of a 
remedy. Not because it was elitist, but because involvement in politics either 
could not change the conditions you faced and, in the worst case scenario, could 
land  you  in  jail,82 or  because  politics  and  thus  politicians  both  from  the 
opposition and the regime were perceived as essentially dirty:
 “I  went  to  the  first  anti-Mubarak  protest  in  2004  but  did  not  get  further 
involved with activism back then in part because I was scared, I felt safer as a 
human rights defender than as a political activist. But another part was also due 
81The Battle of Muhammed Mahmud Street, Jadaliyya, 28.11.2011, 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3312/the-battle-of-muhammad-mahmud-street_teargas-hair-
82Interview with activist, Cairo, 27.04.2011
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to  the  victory  of  stereotypes  about  political  activists  and  opposition.  That 
stereotype is  that they are not  clean people that  are manipulating the young 
people to be in the forefront of protests for their own aims and agendas”83. 
Thus, many of the young, educated middle class professionals simply left the 
country,  some  vowing  never  to  return.  This  attitude  about  the  rationale  for 
involvement  or  lack  thereof  changed significantly  with the  events  that  have 
taken place over the last  two years or so which have shifted the balance of 
rewards for involvement/non-involvement. Part of this change in pay offs – and 
here the standard narrative about the impact of social networking sites is correct 
– certainly has something to do with the ease with which information flows on 
these sites, and the ease of getting ‘involved’ by simply clicking a button, with 
no risk of getting beaten up on the streets.  This eased many middle class, young 
professionals and students into full blown activism on the day of the revolution.
A few, and particularly those that had been active in the human rights and 
NGO sector, remained part of the political process despite not being mobilized 
in protest activity before, joining newly forming political parties like the Social 
Democrats. The majority, however, went back to their regular lives. 
Conclusion
Egypt  has  undeniably  witnessed  incredible  changes  ushered  in  by  the 
momentous events of the past year. Contrary to the opinions of many, it is not 
yet accurate to say that they fall short of the expectations – of observers and 
participants alike – for a meaningful transformation towards a more just and 
democratic political system. Now that the underlying structural processes that 
caused the masses to rise and the youth to rebel are gone, much potential for 
future conflict and mobilization nevertheless remains. In future scenarios this 
could either lead to a tightening of the grip of the state on society, or to a final 
and necessary push for democracy. What is clear as of now, however, is that 
with significant elite segments still in control of the organized means of power 
and coercion in Egyptian society we have so far witnessed neither a political nor 
a social revolution, nor a transition towards democracy. 
The processes have not been without lessons, however. Egypt’s January 
25 ‘revolution’ has taught onlookers and participants alike about the necessity of 
networks of trust and organization between actors established through repeated 
interaction  and  cooperation  in  mutual  endeavors  and  sustained  via  multiple 
channels ranging from face to face interaction on university campuses to virtual 
interaction via facebook and co over time, as those in social movement research 
well know. It has taught of the power of emulation set by the Tunisian example, 
as well as the pressure that protesters united across class lines can exert on a 
seemingly overwhelmingly powerful regime. However, it also taught that those 
83Interview with activist, Cairo, 03.05.2011
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strengths essential to bringing down an authoritarian regime are not necessarily 
those that will be essential in supporting a sustainable transition towards a more 
democratic one. Hence, the youth-driven, leaderless character of the ‘revolution’ 
was its greatest asset but became its greatest weakness, at least where the youth 
activists that carried the organizational process in the run up to the ‘revolution’ 
are  concerned.  When  political  concerns  turned  away  from  easy  to  unite 
demands – i.e. the end of Mubarak – that glossed over substantial differences in 
the  reasons  that  brought  people  to  the  streets,  towards  the  technicalities  of 
organizing elections, electoral system choices or the advantages of one electoral 
system over another and the founding of political parties,  these activists lost 
ground to experienced political players as well as a deeply entrenched military 
that  in  ‘protecting’ the  return  to  normal  politics  resorted  to  the  very  same 
methods activists had come to the streets to defeat. Only time will tell whether 
the messy beginnings of the transition process will lead to a lucky end, but so 
far Tunisia’s new regime seems better prepared for democratic endeavors than 
Egypt’s.
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